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Jt is common knowledge that eveiy effect has its cause, and this is a universal truth, however it is impos
sible to avoid certain errors ofjudgement, or of simple identflcation, for we might think that this effect
comes from that cause, when after all it was some other cause, beyond any understanding we possess or
knowledge we think we possess.
José Saramago, The Stone Raft (transi. G. Pontiero)
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Risk, uncertainty, indeterminacy and ignorance
in fisheries management — an analysis of
management advice
Mikael Hildén
Finnish Environment Institute, P.O. Box 140, FIN-00251 Helsinki, Finland.
Hildén, M. 1997. Risk, uncertainty, indeterminacy and ignorance in fisheries man
agement — an analysis of management advice. Monographs of the Boreal Environ
ment Research No. 5, 1997.
This study combines an ecological perspective on the exploitation of fish resources with
an examination of fisheries management as planning. Through a conceptual, theoretical
and empirical analysis I show that the combined perspective can provide additional in
sights into the problems of fisheries management and into the delivery of scientific advice
for managerial decisions. A central theme is the lack of perfect knowledge and the conse
quences and implications for management advice. A more profound understanding of the
nature of the imperfect knowledge that haunts fisheries scientists may help both producers
and users of management advice to actively strive for the sustainable use of fish resources.
Keywords: Fisheries management, management objectives, fisheries science, manage
ment advice, planning, risk, uncertainty.
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I Introduction
All fisheries are based on the exploitation of eco
logical systems; fishing is therefore an ecological
process. Fishers use ecological knowledge, but they
also depend on technology to locate and catch fish.
As producers of food and other raw material they
are economic actors who react to signals from mar
kets and to other incentives. Fishers are also mem
bers of societies whose traditions, social conditions
and culture regulate and direct their activities. Fish
ing is thus much more than the act of catching fish.
Fisheries are a diverse mixture of ecological, tech
nical, economic, social and cultural variables in
volving many actors and interest groups.
Resource management, which can include re
source enhancement, is a general term for active
regulatory interference with the exploitation of
natural resources. Managerial decisions concern
ing natural resources thus influence a wide range
of processes and phenomena both directly and in
directly. This multidimensionality is particularly
evident in fisheries management. Those who make
managerial decisions use many different types of
knowledge of the structure and functions of the
system to be managed, although the starting point
is usually some ecological knowledge concerning
the resources. Here and subsequently I use knowl
edge in a wide sense, to cover understanding, in
formation and data.
In many small fisheries the same individuals
possess and accumulate knowledge of the state of
the resources, manage the resources and do the fish
ing. In large fisheries, especially in those that are
internationally managed, the tasks are usually sep
arated. In such fisheries we can identifi the fish
ing industry, managers, and the scientific institu
tions whose task it is to supply the managers and
other actors with knowledge of the fisheries. This
differentiation into users and producers of knowl
edge demands communication, which makes the
knowledge explicit. The actors can then question
the knowledge: is it relevant, is it sufficient and is
it valid?
These questions are justified and important,
because the knowledge that fisheries managers and
other actors in fisheries have to rely on is far from
perfect. Those who decide on managerial action
do not have exact knowledge of the state of a fish
ery and its resources, nor can they be fully aware
of the consequences of their decisions. I thus use
the notion of imperfect knowledge in its widest
sense, to cover imperfect data, lack of information
and poor understanding of the systems being stud
ied. An overview of management reality illustrates
the importance of imperfect knowledge. For ex
ample, in 1993 the International Council for the
Exploration of the Sea (ICES) could give no, or
only crude, indicative quantitative information on
half the stocks assessed for management advice
(ICES 1994a). In other parts of the world poor
knowledge is likely to play an even more domi
nant role in the managers’ daily work.
I focus on knowledge, because its imperfections
acquire specific significance in resource manage
ment. Arguments concerning the structure, func
tion and dynamics of the system to be managed
constitute not only an academic debate over differ
ent interpretations of reality, but also a dispute over
whose reality and world view will determine man
agerial decisions. Thus imperfect knowledge en
ters all the tasks and phases of the elaborate proc
esses for deriving decision-making material and
decisions that have been set up to compensate for
the lack of direct observation and control of fisher
ies and fish resources.
Although there are examples of early consider
ations of imperfect knowledge in fisheries research
(Ricker 1958, Walters and Hilborn 1976), system
atic interest in risk and uncertainty in fisheries is
of recent origin (Walters 1986, Christie and Span
gler 1987, Beamish and McFarlane 1989, Smith et
a!. 1993). Analysis of the effects of, and responses
to, imperfect knowledge of fisheries have advanced
rapidly.
Similar interest has arisen in environmental is
sues in general (Dovers and Handmer 1995). A prac
tical response to imperfect knowledge has been the
development of a precautionary approach (Garcia
1994), with guidance for management to make the
approach operational (FAQ l995a). Examples of
cautious management are readily available, but the
question of how cautious is cautious enough will
always be encountered.
Resource management scientists, who have no
ticed the existence of the imperfect knowledge of
resources and its potential consequences for deci
sions, have arrived at different conclusions as to
its significance. What might be called the pessi
mistic view holds that population models are poor
ly supported by available data (Hall 1988), or that
the sources of uncertainties are so large that over
exploitation ofresources cannot be prevented (Lud
wig et a!. 1993). Alternatively, biological models
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have been based on a flawed paradigm that has led
to the wrong type of management structure (Wil
son et at. 1994). A more optimistic view suggests
that the systematic analysis of risks will provide
managers with the information necessary for
achieving sustainable use of natural resources
(Rosenberg et al. 1993). At a general level there is
support for both viewpoints. The spectacular fail
ures of management efforts in some extensively
researched fisheries (Hilbom and Walters 1992,
Finlayson 1993, Schrank 1995) support the pessi
mistic view. On the other hand, Frederick and Pe
terman’s (1995) results support the more optimis
tic view. They showed that in a strictly quantita
tive sense, there are cases in which management
decisions are not affected by lack of biological
knowledge. It is also possible to analyse quantita
tively when lack of knowledge matters.
The objective of this study is to examine the
sources and nature of imperfect knowledge in fish
eries management. In other words: I shall examine
why knowledge is imperfect and why recommen
dations that are based on available knowledge do
not materialise into action. This leads to a discus
sion on how imperfections of knowledge should
be taken into account in compiling scientific sup
port for management decisions. The perspective is
that of the scientists producing material to help
those making managerial decisions. Many of these
scientists are biologists, but researchers of other
disciplines are increasingly involved in producing
material for managers and other actors in fisheries
management. I refer to all these suppliers of knowl
edge as fisheries scientists.
The multifaceted nature of the issue of imper
fect knowledge and of fisheries themselves calls
for examination from different viewpoints. Inte
gration of ecological theory with planning theory
and decision analysis defined as “the careful de
liberation that precedes a decision” (French 1988)
sets the conceptual framework for the study. The
extent of the subject is such that not all aspects can
be equally covered. The individual studies (1-VIl)
on which this synthesis is based are examples of
different problem areas. Combined with a broad
literature review and the additional analyses pre
sented in this synthesis, they outline some crucial
features of imperfections of knowledge in fisher
ies management. My study thus contributes to fish
eries management science in the sense of Stephen
son and Lane (1995). At the practical level it is
closely related to the idea of “ignorance auditing”
(Dovers and Handmer 1995). It also provides a new
perspective on the optimistic and pessimistic views
of the potential for knowledge to support sustaina
ble fisheries management.
After a theoretical and methodological overview
(Sections 2 and 3)1 shall examine imperfect knowl
edge of the biological system (Section 4). This ana
lysis is based largely on an examination of models,
because models are central tools in providing sci
entific advice for fisheries management. The mod
els reflect and affect the perception and analysis of
key processes, identification of means, assessment
of outcomes and monitoring of consequences. In
Section 5, I shall discuss management advice and
the role of imperfect knowledge in formulating this
advice. Management advice relates to boundaries
and choice of action in the management process.
This is followed by an analysis of how imperfect
knowledge relates to the objectives of fisheries
management (Section 6). Finally, I shall discuss
the implications of the findings for the provision
of scientific support for decisions aiming at sus
tainable use of fishery resources (Section 7).
2 Background
2.1 Theoretical foundations
The concept of imperfect knowledge is broad, and
some categorisation is necessary before we can dis
cuss it in detail. There is, however, no generally
accepted terminology. The economic literature gen
erally refers to uncertainty or to markets with im
perfect information in contrast to the assumption
of perfect markets that underlies a significant part
of classical microeconomic theory (Kreps 1990).
Uncertainty and risk are sometimes interchanged.
Decision and risk analysts tend to give “risk” a very
precise numerical meaning (Winterfeldt and Ed
wards 1986), whereas “risk” for some sociologists
has become a very broad concept (Szerszynski et
al. 1996). For example, Eräsaari (1993) suggests
that the transformation of societal problem cate
gories can be described as an evolution from “ques
tions”, for which an answer has been promised, to
“problems”, which can be regulated, and, finally,
to “risks”, for which there are no answers, not even
regulation.
Dovers and Handmer (1995) list three different
classifications of “ignorance”, which they use as
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the general concept. Here I use imperfect know!
edge as the general concept. Throughout this study
I shall use Wynne’s (1992) classification of differ
ent types of imperfect knowledge. Thus, when
necessary, 1 shall distinguish between risk, uncer
tainty, ignorance and indeterminacy. The distinc
tions are that risk can be quantified and uncertain
ty delimited and reduced, but that ignorance es
capes recognition by definition. Indeterminacy, or
what Feldman (1989) at a political level calls am
biguity, is an expression for open causal chains or
networks (Wynne 1992). The categories may dif
fer in degree of imperfection of knowledge and the
distinctions may be fuzzy but they still provide us
with a way to conceptualise tendencies that are sig
nificant in developing management and manage
ment advice.
The other starting point of my study is ecologi
cal science and the concept of sustainability. The
state of the resource is thus a key criterion in evalu
ating resource management. The premise of a re
cent definition of sustainability is that “biogeo
physical sustainability is the maintenance and/or
improvement of the integrity of the life-support sys
tem on Earth” (Munasinghe and Shearer 1995). In
the Convention on Biological Diversity (Rio Con
vention 1992) sustainable use is defined as “the
use of components of biological diversity in a way
and at a rate that does not lead to the long term
decline of biological diversity, thereby maintain
ing its potential to meet the needs and aspirations
of present and future generations.” This is the def
inition I refer to throughout the study.
With its reference to the needs and aspirations
of present and future generations, the Rio defini
tion of sustainability shows that socio-economic
and political issues are relevant. An analysis of the
role of imperfect knowledge must therefore address
both ecological and socio-economic aspects of the
exploitation of fisheries resources. To achieve this
I view management in relation to several dimen
sions of ecological and planning theory. Such an
approach leads to the use of conceptual extremes
in the discussion. Real fisheries management ob
viously combines several different features. The
extremes serve to characterise some key tenden
cies of fisheries management and they allow me to
examine the differences in their relation to imper
fections of knowledge.
Exploitation of fish resources can be viewed
from the point of view of population dynamics,
community ecology or population genetics. In its
simplest form, exploitation is a factor governing
the dynamics of a single population. When species
interactions are introduced the exploitation be
comes a community ecological phenomenon. An
other option is to remove the assumption of a ge
netically static homogeneous unit stock and view
exploitation as a factor influencing population gen
etics. When the two extensions are combined the
exploitation of fish resources becomes an ecosys
tem issue.
Ranging from international negotiations to lo
cal community-based management, the many in
stitutions and institutionalised processes that have
evolved for different types of fishery show that fish
eries management is a socio-political activity. The
management process and its demand for and use of
knowledge cannot be understood merely with ref
erence to the ecological systems that it seeks to
control. Management is usually a public activity
and can be regarded as a form of planning for the
wise use of resources. Planning theory can there
fore be a fruitful perspective for gaining insight
into management as a social and political process.
Resource management is, however, a particular type
of planning in that ecological processes strongly
influence the planning agenda and the opportuni
ties for control. Here I consider planning theory
together with ecological theory to obtain a theoret
ical reference for resource management. The con
ceptual link between the ecological system and
planning is clearly control of the exploitation of
resources. Figure 1 illustrates the conceptual con
nections. Subsection 2.2 deals with the practical
connections between planning and the ecosystems
and the exploitation of these ecosystems in fisher
ies.
The theory of planning I refer to in Figure 1 is
Sager’s (1990, 1994) contingency approach to plan
ning. The key feature of this approach is a concep
tualization of planning in three dichotomies (Sag
er 1990): synoptic planning versus incrementalism,
which reflects the degree of control over the sys
tem to be planned; technique versus communica
tion, which is related to the underlying rationality
of the plan; and flexibility versus rigidity, through
which problems of efficiency and risk become
meaningful. I specificly address questions related
to control and rationality. Risk is discussed as one
aspect of imperfect knowledge. Efficiency is not
dealt with and flexibility is only briefly touched on
in the concluding section.
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Multispecies Ecosystems
>itation
Genetic
Unit stock population
slightly modified from Sager (1990).
2.2 The management process
Before we can examine the sources and role of
imperfect information we must place the analysis
in the context of the management process. As not
ed above, management can be regarded as a form
of planning that includes collecting and process
ing information on the future, delivering technical
input to decision-making processes, arranging for
communication among the parties involved in the
decision-making, preparing for collective action,
finding out by rational means how to achieve goals,
making strategic proposals and managing conflicts
over which future actions to choose (Sager 1990).
When planning aims at rational action and the
processing of knowledge for rational action we can
identif,’ some characteristics of “optimal” planning.
Elster (1989) notes that an optimal amount of evi
dence should be available for a rational action, but
the optimality depends on the desires the action
should fulfill and on beliefs about the costs and
benefits of gathering more information. This rais
es the question, what do we consider rational?
Being firmly rooted in biological sciences, “in
strumental reason” in the sense of Habermas (1971)
not surprisingly dominates fisheries management.
Instrumental rationality provides guidance on the
use of means to achieve stated objectives without
attaching preferences to the means. The concepts
of maximum or optimum sustainable yields dem
onstrate the existence of goal-oriented instrumen
tal rationality in fisheries management. Interna
tional agreements and fisheries legislation, e.g. the
Finnish Act on Fisheries (286/82, Section 1), have
codified instrumental rationality. But if this were
the only rationality, many actions would have to
Community
ecology
Population
dynamics
Population
genetics
Collective choice processes Power relations
Synoptic! Technique!
Incremental Communication
NNn7Z
Flexibility!
Rigidity
Conflict management Legitimation of planning
Fig. 1. The ecological concepts related to the exploitation of fish resources, and planning theoretical concepts relat
ed to the management of exploitation. Relevant ecological disciplines are noted outside the exploitation frame. Differ
ent aspects of the planning environment are indicated outside the managementframe. The lower part of the figure is
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be defined as irrational. Sager (1990) has shown
that planning can be more deeply understood by
introducing concepts for non-instrumental reason
such as Habermas’s (1984) “communicative ration
ality”, which emphasises processes rather than the
goal. In fisheries management this can simply mean
that the management is motivated not so much by
the nebulous concept of maximum sustainable yield
as by the social activity and communication lead
ing to management decisions. I shall show that the
underlying rationality will affect the perception of
imperfect knowledge and the responses considered
appropriate even in assembling biological knowl
edge for fisheries management.
Table 1. Basic tasks of management and their interpretation in a fisheries context.
General management task Examples of interpretations in fisheries management
1) Set the system boundaries
- Determine the geographical area of the resource(s)
- Determine which interactions are considered relevant
- Determine who are the stakeholders
- Determine the “relevant considerations”
2) Determine the objectives General objectives:
and make them operational
- Yield maximisation
- Maximisation of economic rent
- Supply of recreational opportunities
- Conservation of resources
Specific targets:
- Level for fishing mortality
- Short and long term yields
- Escapement levels
- Number of fishers
3) Analyse and understand key processes
- Analysis and prediction of recruitment and stock size
of the system
- Determination of growth and mortality patterns
- Identification of interactions
- Estimation of fishing effort and factors affecting it
4) Determine the means available for - Regulation of catches (quotas) = output control
achieving the objectives in relation to - Regulation of fishing effort (temporal, spatial,
understanding of the processes and the technological) input control
chosen objectives
- Regulation of entry and exit (licensing, a form of input
control)
- Resource enhancement
5) Assess possible actions and outcomes in
- Which quota will bring the fishing mortality down to the
relation to 3) and 4) target level?
-
Can resource enhancement produce expected yields or
economic returns?
6) Decide on action conditional on 1), 2), - Decisions by local, regional, national or international
and 5) management body
7) monitor the consequences
- Scientific sampling of catches, collection of fisheries
statistics
- Population monitoring
- Modelling of population response
- Analysis of response in fishery
8) repeat steps 1 to 7
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The actual management can be carried out by very
different groups such as authorities, communities,
private owners of waters or individuals with fish
ing rights, but the process typically involves the
same basic tasks (Table 1). These tasks are similar
in any planning or management problem (Rosen-
head 1989) and they all involve making decisions
using available knowledge. The making of deci
sions should here be understood in a wide sense. It
is a question not only of setting quotas or gear re
strictions but also of determining what should be
investigated and what objectives should steer the
process. The concept of rational action underlies
the whole structure and also each task individual
ly. When strictly instrumental considerations domi
nate, the tasks are considered to form a linear se
quence. In the ideal case, perfect knowledge leads
to omnipotent or synoptic planning (Sager 1990).
Sager (1990) suggests that the appropriate contrast
to synoptic planning is “social incrementalistic
planning”, which is rooted in Lindblom’s (1959)
concept of “muddling through” but expanded to
include unlimited communicative rationality. In
incrementalistic planning, knowledge of the past,
present and future is imperfect, and the exact na
ture of expectations concerning future states of the
world is unknown (Schiller 1987).
Fisheries management is influenced by the bio
logical system. The cyclic nature of the underlying
biological system often emphasizes repeated
measures and regular reassessments. There are al
ways some new recruits to a fish stock and the fish
are continually growing. In a limited sense stocks
and fisheries have been sustainable up to the
present, a factor that influences the type of adjust
ments managers are willing to consider. At the same
time flexibility is important. Despite the cyclicity
of the biological system there is no guarantee that
the next year will be like the present. Recruitment
may differ by an order of magnitude and migration
may lead to an apparent decline in a stock.
As in all decision problems, feed-backs and it
erations between tasks are possible (Raiffa 1968)
(Fig. 2). For example, new understanding of key
Feedback
/
Fig. 2. The relationship between management tasks. Tasks dominated by decision making are given as squares
whereas tasks dominated by scientific analysis are given in ovals. The feed back can affect all the tasks.
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National fisheries
administration:
implementation and
enforcement of
international
management measures,
national management
Negotiations and
quota share
Bargaining and
quota result
Request for
advice to
ICES, advice
to IBSFC
Data and other
information
International
assessment
(ICES working group)
Assessment
International
scientific evaluation
of assessment
(ICES ACFM)
Stock enhancement
Exhange of
knowledge,
delivery of
advice
Supranational
management body
(EC Commission):
quota distribution and
commission level
management decisions
International
management body
(IBSFC): quota
negotiations and other
management decisions
Fig. 3. A generalisatiori of the management structure for international stocks in the Baltic Sea. Similar structures
occurthroughoutthe ICES area. The many negotiation levels emphasisethe political nature of knowledge.
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processes may lead to a revision of boundaries and
objectives, and the results of monitoring to a revi
sion of any other task. In fisheries management,
biological considerations have dominated tasks 1),
3) and 5), but feed-backs and iterations cause bio
logical considerations to be taken into account in
all tasks. This is also indicated in Figure 2. I shall
explore imperfections in our knowledge of the bio
logical system and its connection with other items
of knowledge and the managerial decisions in great
er detail in the following sections. At this stage it
is sufficient to note that two roles dominate. First,
imperfections of knowledge play a role in the in
strumental concern for sustainability of the fishery
resource: Sustainability is a specified objective, but
how do we know whether we are approaching or
moving away from sustainable conditions? Second,
imperfections of knowledge have a role in the plan-
fling environment, with its collective choice pro
cesses, questions of legitimation, power relations
and conflict management. The planning environ
ment involves many different actors, because the
management systems, especially of international
ly managed fisheries, include many partly or wholly
separate functions (Fig. 3). In such an environment
knowledge easily becomes political.
3 Material and methods
3.1 Terminology and abbreviations
Throughout the study the following abbreviations
have been used for standard concept in fisheries
research.
F Instantaneous rate of fishing
mortality (timej
F0 = The instantaneous rate of fishing
mortality at a point where the slope
of the curve relating yield per recruit
to the fishing mortality rate is 1/10 of
the slope at the origin.
F The instantaneous rate of fishing
mortality at a point where the curve
relating yield per recruit to the fishing
mortality rate reaches its maximum.
M = Instantaneous rate of natural
mortality (time-1)
MSVPA = Multispecies Virtual Population
Analysis
R = Recruitment, usually defined as
recruitment to the exploited part of
the population at a particular age.
SSB = Spawning Stock Biomass, i.e.
biomass of the mature part of the
population.
TAC = Total Allowable Catch, i.e. maximum
quota set for a fixed period of time,
usually a year.
Y/R = Yield per Recruit, i.e. the expected
yield from a fish recruiting to the
exploited part of the population given
its growth and mortality pattern as a
function of age
Z =F+M
3.2 Model sensitivities
I have analysed the sensitivity of three simple fish
population models to imperfect knowledge (1,11,111).
The general form for the models is derived from
ecological principles governing population change.
The differential equation dN/dt=g(N) or its differ
ence equivalent N(t+1) = u(N(t)), where N stands
for population or year class and g and u for func
tions, are the basic equations of most assessment
models (Beverton and Holt 1957, Seber 1982,
Ricker 1975, Gulland 1983, Hilborn and Walters
1992). Their origins can be traced to the 1920s
(Ricker 1977). I have further analysed models for
the fate of individual year classes without (1) or
with (II,IV) species interactions, and a classical
model of the relationship between the spawners and
subsequent recruitment (III).
The virtual population analysis or cohort analy
sis examined in (I) and (II) underlies nearly all the
scientific management advice based on “analyti
cal assessments” provided by, among others, the
International Council for the Exploration of the Sea
(ICES). The same equations are also found in the
core of advice on the western Atlantic and several
Pacific fish stocks. The stock recruitment model
of (III) is extensively used in Pacific salmon man
agement (Hilborn and Walters 1992). In fisheries
management other models such as those based on
the Leslie matrix (Seber 1982), biomass models
(Laevastu and Larkins 1981) and delay-difference
equations have also been used. For management
the fundamental problems are, however, the same:
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do the models provide a plausible description of
the dynamics of the resource and its exploitation,
can reasonable parameter values be determined and
do the models provide a tool for predictions that
can be used in management? These problems are
of practical and theoretical importance in the man
agement process.
Sensitivity analysis can be performed using many
different techniques (Swartzman and Kaluzny 1987),
but the objective of providing a deeper understand
ing of the models and their results is common to all.
A sensitivity analysis cannot falsify or provide sup
port for a model because “it is impossible to tell
from the picture alone whether it is true or false”
(Wittgenstein 1921, 2.224). It can, however; deepen
our understanding of the picture and thus point to
wards avenues for research and examination of par
ticular features of reality.
In (1) I combined analytical derivation of the ef
fects of bias in the natural mortality rate in the clas
sical virtual population analysis (or cohort analysis)
with simulations and examined the feasibility of re
moving distortions that the choice of natural mor
tality rate can create. A feature of the virtual popu
lation analysis used in the argumentation is its ten
dency to be conservative with respect to the total
mortality rate. Furthermore a “tuning” procedure,
i.e. adjustment of the fishing mortality rates for the
oldest age group using historical data on fishing ef
fort and mortality rates, will tend to compensate for
overestimation of the natural mortality rate with
underestimation of the fishing mortality rate, and
vice versa (ICES 1993).
In (II) and (III) I used the Fourier Amplitude Sen
sitivity Test (FAST) developed by Cukier eta!. (1978)
for the sensitivity analysis. The FAST technique
permits effective and systematic examination of dif
ferent combinations of deviations of parameter val
ues from the nominal values. It has the advantage
that the effects of a particular parameter can easily
be identified in the output by examining the frequen
cy spectrum of the output variability.
In the applications no correlations were assumed
between the parameters. The notion of a “joint-prob
ability distribution” in (III, p. 41) is thus somewhat
misleading, because the parameter values are picked
from the individual uncorrelated distributions, en
suring, however, that all possible combinations are
effectively covered. I did not consider the lack of
correlation between the parameters to be a major
drawback in the examination of the models I have
focused on. In a model of several species with cor
related growth patterns, however, the independence
assumption would clearly be unrealistic. Another
theoretical criticism of the method concerns the use
of truncated uniform distributions, as these may ne
glect the effects of extreme but infrequent parame
ter values. In these studies I considered that the ef
fective mapping of all parameter combinations gives
a sufficient picture of the model b thaviour. I solved
the problem of truncation by using ranges of para
meter values wide enough to cover most values that
could be realistically assumed or estimated.
A practical disadvantage of the FAST technique
is that it requires a rapidly increasing number of sim
ulations to keep pace with the growth in number of
parameters. I therefore had to simplify the multi
species population analysis to the examination of a
single cohort (II). In so doing I followed the sugges
tion of Holling (1978) that the essence of a complex
model should be investigated in a reduced model.
Another option would have been to set up a frac
tional factorial design for the model simulations
(Cochran 1977, Swartzman and Kaluzny 1987). Such
a design relies on a statistical analysis between para
meter input values and model results to identify the
most important parameters, and avoids the problem
of too many simulations. This technique has been
used by the multispecies assessment working group
of ICES (1994b). They did not, however; systemat
ically examine the effects of different functional re
sponses until 1993.
In (III) I introduce an economic dimension in the
form of the discount rate and the catch value. Al
though incomplete, this dimension permits a crude
analysis of the possible consequences of economic
factors on decisions concerning resource manage
ment. In the same context I examined some of the
features that may affect entry and exit decisions by
looking not only at the variability and the mean, but
also at the frequency of low yield (income) situa
tions.
3.3 Factors affecting management advice
Imperfections of knowledge, and especially what in
everyday usage are called risks, are partly social
constructs (Merkhofer 1987, Freudenburg 1988). The
perception of the quality of knowledge influences
the decisions taken by all actors in a fishery, manag
ers included. Sometimes imperfections of knowl
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edge are seen to centre on biological issues and
models, sometimes on social, technological or eco
nomic issues. Whatever the case it is clear that man
agement processes and decisions cannot be under
stood through quantitative analysis of model behav
iour alone.
In (IV), actual management advice is contrasted
with available information. ICES, which produces
the advice, has used class decision rules for deriv
ing management advice from available evidence.
Attempts have been made to formalise the decision
rules for producing fisheries management advice in
relation to specific reference points. The earliest
approaches were based on the concept of maximum
sustainable yield, but these have been dismissed in
favour of more fuzzy biological reference points (V).
This suggests a deliberate loosening of the connec
tion between the biological information derived from
population models and the management advice.
ICES produces scientific management advice in
a partly subjective and partly objective process in
which the final result is an outcome of negotiations
between nationally appointed experts using model
estimations and other available knowledge as basic
material (Fig. 3). To search for possible signals of
key information in the final advice I examined the
relationship between model output and advice us
ing historical data series. In the exploratory phase I
also used simple regression models. No claim of
causal explanation is, however, made for the mod
els, and in the original contribution (IV) parameter
values were not reported for the models. Here I give
a fuller account of the statistical analysis of the data.
Due to the nature of the process, however, no statis
tical analysis can detect all relevant aspects. Full
analysis of how management advice evolves in the
process would demand a sociological analysis of all
key actors. Such an analysis, showing the consider
able importance of personal relations, subjective
judgements and idiosyncracies, has been presented
for the case of northern cod in Canada (Finlayson
1993).
3.4 The effects of management advice
If the knowledge provided by scientists were accept
ed, and managers and politicians were to follow bio
logical advice to the letter the state of fish resources
should improve. This is in essence the justification
for the elaborate systems of assembling knowledge
that are part of fisheries management throughout the
world. The hypothesis that scientific knowledge is
the key to management can be tested using empiri
cal data on management advice and the develop
ment of the fish stock status (V). I did this using a
simple overview of all stocks for which advice has
been given at two moments in time. The time inter
val I chose was long enough to allow changes in
stock status to take place, but short enough to pre
vent methodological development or management
structure from having too great an impact. This meth
od could yield erroneous conclusions because fac
tors other than the fishery might lead scientists to
recommend stricter management measures for the
protection of the stocks. I therefore supplemented
the general analysis with a detailed examination of
two stocks that have been of major concern to ICES
scientists, namely, North Sea haddock and cod (V).
I chose these stocks because their development has
significantly affected the nature of the scientific ad
vice given by the ICES. For example, in 1990, the
ICES ceased giving management advice in the form
of a specific total allowable catch (TAC) for these
stocks (ICES 1991a). I further supplemented the
analysis with data on advice concerning other stocks
compiled from the reports of the Advisory Commit
tee on Fishery Management (ACFM) 1979-1995
(Appendix 1).
To gain deeper insight into the use of advice I
have examined the statistical associations between
relevant variables. One of these is recruitment vari
ability. One might argue that advice on stocks whose
abundance varies greatly would be difficult to fol
low. As a consequence, the management advice
would also have to display greater variability sim
ply because the need to advice a reduction in fishing
mortality rates might arise more frequently than for
stable stocks. As an indicator of recruitment vari
ability I have used Myers et al’s (l995a) results
based on log transformed recruitment data. In addi
tion to the ecological variable I have examined the
total value of the catch and the price per weight.
Data on prices are available at a crude level from
the FAO fishery statistics year book (FAO 1995b). I
obtained the average value of the catch, which indi
cates the value of the resource, by multiplying the
average catch as reported by ICES (1996) by the
unit price.
I analysed the management advice, recruitment
variability and price information using log-linear
models (Bishop et al. 1975), because the recommen
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dations can then be examined as discrete classes. In
the analysis I used three categories of recommenda
tions: those to keep or accept the present rate of fish
ing mortality rate; those to reduce the fishing mor
tality rate; and strong recommendations to reduce
the fishing mortality rate. The distinction between a
recommendation to reduce the fishing mortality rate
and a strong recommendation to do so is sometimes
subtle. I have interpreted the recommendation as
strong when the ACFM has recommended an reduc
tion of at least 20 per cent.
The price, catch and recruitment variables are
continuous, but the quality and availability of the
data differ. To ensure a minimum level of quality I
used only stocks for which a so called analytical
assessment had been made and recommendations
given for 1990 to 1995 (Appendix 2 and 3). The
price data are areal averages. The mean catches and
recruitment variability have been calculated for
available time series by ICES (1995) and Myers et
al. (1995a) respectively. The recommendations are
reviewed yearly. For the analysis I discretised catch
value and recruitment variability into four classes
using quartiles of the data. For the price of fish I
identified three classes (< 0.5, 0.5 < 2, 2 US
dollars per kg). I analysed the data using the CAT-
MOD and FREQ procedures of the SAS package
(SAS Institute 1989).
3.5 Sources of conflict in management
and management advice
The introduction of negotiations in the production
of management advice as well as in management
decisions (Fig. 3) indicates implicit recognition of
the possibility of different interpretations of bio
logical knowledge. I addressed this question by ex
amining a specific conflict (VI). In this case I ob
tained crude quantitative estimates of the conflict
of interest using the basic population and catch
equations of (I), but in addition I analysed written
material to find evidence of other conflict dimen
sions (VI). Previous analyses (Nettleship et al.
1984, ICES 1 994c) have focused only on the quan
titative aspect of the competition between seabirds
and fisheries.
3.6 Assembling knowledge for decisions
supporting sustainability
Sustainable use is specified as the general objec
tive of resource management. This objective has
been set by numerous international bodies, confer
ences and conventions, including the UN Conven
tion on the Law of the Sea (United Nations 1983)
and UNCED’s Agenda 21 (United Nations 1992).
To be meaningful the concept of sustainability has
to be operationalised in specific sectors. In fisher
ies management sustainability becomes an issue
in such matters as the rules on fishing methods and
the size of catches; the protection and enhancement
of fish resources; fishery development; and the
mediation of conflict between actors and interest
groups.
To examine the potential of management advice
to promote sustainability I chose the major fish re
sources of the Baltic Sea as a case (VII). By sys
tematically investigating the type of management
advice given, the factors that appear to influence
the fisheries of the major fish stocks in the Baltic
Sea and available information on fisheries, I was
able to suggest indicators for sustainable resource
use referring specificly to fisheries. Methodologi
cally the study (VII) is closely connected to the
development of environmental indicators (OECD
1994, Hammond et al. 1995), with the difference
that, in the case of the Baltic Sea, we can identify
in advance the decisions for which the information
should be usable.
4 Imperfect knowledge of the
ecological system
In the following I use the observations in the indi
vidual studies (I-VII) together with other related
published sources to examine the nature of imper
fect knowledge of the ecological system. This sec
tion explores the imperfections of knowledge faced
by scientists attempting to analyse a fishery. Since
my starting point is the basic issues affecting the
analysis of any biological system, I first examine
the imperfections of knowledge that are related to
the geographical boundaries, sampling and model
ling. I go onto examine imperfections in the knowl
edge of key factors in the dynamics of an isolated
single, or unit, stock. The analysis is then expand
ed by examining the effects of relaxing some cen
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tral restrictive assumptions of the unit stock con-
cept.
4.1 Basic issues
4.1.1 Geographical boundaries
Geographical boundaries are necessary for man
agement. Ideally, boundaries delimit a unit such
that interaction with other units is minimal. Man
agement measures can then be focused, and so in
terfere minimally with neighbouring units. In real
ity only almost closed systems such as small lakes
approach this ideal. In larger systems boundaries
are always to a lesser or greater extent arbitrary.
They are compromises because relevant processes
operate on different spatial scales.
A single fishing fleet may exploit several sepa
rate fish populations at different rates, but it is not
always possible to manage the stocks separately.
Instead the area in which a fleet operates can be
used to define boundaries. On the other hand, many
different fleets may exploit a common resource,
e.g. highly migratory or straddling stocks. The dis
tribution of the stock would then seem to be the
best way to define the boundaries. In reality, both
cases often occur within the same geographical
area. For example, in the Baltic Sea, the salmon
population of the river Tornionjoki is exploited by
many fisheries. At the same time Finland’s coastal
fisheries exploit several populations of salmon sim
ultaneously, thus contributing to overexploitation
(ICES 1994a). Similar problems can be found
throughout the world, making management units
matters of agreement and convenience as much as
ecological entities.
The choices that have to be made concerning
geographical boundaries introduce the subject of
imperfections in knowledge of the resource. It may
sometimes be possible to estimate the risks posed
by the choice of particular geographical bounda
ries. In salmon management, considerable effort
has been spent on stock identification, and proba
bilities can be determined for the distribution of
catches of different populations (ICES 1994a). In
other cases, boundaries (or lack of them) may lead
to uncertainty and ignorance. For example, the de
mise of vendace, Coregonus albula (L.) in the Finn
ish part of the Bothnian Bay, the Baltic Sea, defied
explanation until tagging results revealed an influx
of vendace from the Swedish side (Lehtonen and
Enderlein 1984). The intensification of the Swed
ish vendace fishery reduced this influx (Hildén et
al. 1984). Failure to observe the boundary between
inshore and offshore cod fishery together with dif
ferent developments in the two areas has been pos
tulated as a reason for not recognising signs of de
cline in the cod stock off Newfoundland (Hutch
ings and Myers 1994).
4.1.2 Sampling
The theory of sampling ecological phenomena and
other relevant fisheries variables is well developed.
Standard texts on sampling (Cochran 1977) give
the general structure that is applied in the sampling
of variables relevant to an analysis fish population
dynamics (Doubleday and Rivard 1983). The dis
tinction between precision and accuracy (Cochran
1977) is important. The precision obtained in sam
pling can be quantified with standard techniques.
In well designed stock surveys coefficients of var
iation as low as 10 per cent can be obtained for
some variables, e.g. the proportion of fish of a par
ticular age in the total catch (Schweigert and Sib
ert 1983, Hildén et al. 1984, Kimura 1989), al
though coefficients of variation of 20 per cent or
higher are more common (Doubleday and Rivard
1981). Recreational catches can be estimated with
coefficients of variation down to 10 per cent
(Leinonen 1988), although in some situations they
may exceed 100 per cent (Meredith and Malvestu
to 1991). A danger of bias is inherent in all sam
pling and thus coefficients of variation do not nec
essarily reflect true imperfections of knowledge.
Leinonen (1988) observed that bias was typically
large in precise catch estimates but less so in im
precise estimates, showing that low coefficients of
variation may create a false perception of certain
ty. The danger of bias emphasises the role of the
sampling design in reducing the imperfections of
knowledge connected with the sampling process.
Unbiased sampling can be dealt with as a quantifi
able risk. Bias can sometimes be delimited and then
treated as a risk, but in most cases it will be a source
of uncertainty or ignorance in management advice.
To reflect the lack of knowledge that sampling
causes I used ranges of values for input variables
and parameters in the fisheries models (I, II, III)
20 Hildén Monographs of the Boreal Environment Research No. 5
and in the probabilistic statements for the state of
fish stocks and their productivity (VI). In practice
it is, however, difficult to separate the lack of
knowledge of parameter values caused by sampling
from that caused by, say, choice of geographical
boundaries. Migration patterns and mortality rates
are easily confused.
4.1.3 Models for assessment and
management
Models of biological phenomena are the intellectu
al tools underlying all resource management, even
when they are only expressed at a heuristic level in
the form of assumed dependencies between vari
ables. A model represents a particular choice of im
perfect knowledge.
The use of models in resource management dif
fers conceptually from the use of models in basic
ecological research. In ecological research, under
standing and prediction are major modelling objec
tives (May 1981). Resource management is based
on the idea of active intervention. Prescriptive as
sessments of present and future states dominate
management modelling. The models include con
trol variables that management can manipulate. A
key task of modelling is considered to be a reduc
tion of uncertainty (Vans et al. 1994). This is true in
the sense that loose arguments are given a clear struc
ture. Risks associated with the use of a particular
model can be assessed in relation to historical data.
But since a management model also imposes its
structure on decisions governing future states of the
system it can become a source of ignorance. This is
especially true of the large number of models (Al
len 1953, Beverton and Holt 1957, Palm 1975, Clark
1976; 1985) devoted to the optimisation of resource
exploitation.
Much has been written about the identification
and choice of appropriate model structures (Vemuri
1978, Halfon l983a,b, 1985, Bartell et al. 1988,
Kettunen 1993), but models cannot be definitely
verified (Swartzman and Kaluzny 1987). In resource
management an adaptive approach aiming to pro
duce data that can help to refute some model struc
tures and corroborate others may provide opportu
nities for reducing uncertainties without increasing
ignorance (Holling 1978, Walters 1986, Walters and
Collie 1989, Sainsbuiy 1991).
The inherent imperfections of knowledge con-
cerning both models and available data cast doubt
on the use of deterministic mechanistic models.
Explicit recognition of a lack of knowledge led me
to the use of crude probabilistic modelling (VI).
However, a true reduction of the risks and uncer
tainties involving the biological components of a
fishery requires that the two modelling approaches
should complement one another as in (VI).
4.2 Population dynamics of a single stock
The perception of the dynamics of exploited popu
lations is critical for management. Mortality and
recruitment, which determine the size and produc
tivity of exploitable resources, are key ecological
processes. Imperfections of our understanding of
these processes are due to the sampling of biologi
cal phenomena but they are also caused by the choice
and fitting of models.
4.2.1 The rate of natural mortality
Together with the fishing mortality rate, the natural
mortality rate is a central parameter determining the
dynamics of age-structured fish population models.
Historically the natural mortality rate has been cho
sen using auxiliary information on species longevi
ty, linear regression of total mortality rate against
fishing effort (Gulland 1983), tagging data (Ricker
1975, Seber 1982) or the known number of stocked
fish and catches (Salojärvi 1991). In a few cases
knowledge has been available from unfished or light
ly exploited populations (Ricker 1975). Since the
natural mortality rate is an aggregate of a wide range
of ecological phenomena from predation to disease
and life history strategies the possible variation
around any point estimate is clearly considerable.
For example, Salojarvi (1992) reported variations
in instantaneous rates of between 0.07 and 0.37 from
his studies of whitefish, and Lapointe et al. (1989)
consider variations of± 50 per cent of the point es
timate.
The development of multispecies models has at
lowedestimates to be made of natural mortality rates
(Sissenwine and Daan 1991). Calculated coefficients
of variation for model outputs of predation mortali
ty rates varied from 0.15 to 0.36 for prey species
such as herring and sandeel (I). Estimation of the
natural mortality rate has reduced some ignorance
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but opened up several new sources of imperfect
knowledge. Poor knowledge of the predation proc
ess is one example (11). Another is inadequacies in
the estimation of the amount of food consumed by
predators, which depending on the submodel can
result in major differences in predator effects (ICES
1991b, Hansson eta!. 1995). These issues represent
uncertainties, however, not ignorance, because they
can be addressed through experimental work and
through analysis of monitoring data.
4.2.2 Recruitment
Recruitment to existing fish stocks is a strong driv
ing variable in determining the dynamics ofexploited
fish populations. Recruitment levels can be deter
mined through catch rates of surveys or through di
rect enumeration using a method such as hydroa
coustics, or they can be estimated post factum using
population models. Ever since Hjort (1914) recruit
ment variability has been of interest to fisheries sci
entists. Recruitment data show considerable varia
tion (Cushing 1977, Rotschild 1986, Myers et al.
1995a). The interpretation of the processes deter
mining variability has a direct influence on the eval
uation of the consequences of different management
options.
It is commonly assumed that the variability ob
served in recruitment levels is largely exogenously
driven by climatic factors (Cushing 1982). Alterna
tively one can assume that the variability arises en
dogenously from deterministic chaos (Wilson et a!.
1991, Wilson eta!. 1994). So far there is scant evi
dence for chaotic behaviour in exploited fish popu
lations (Fogarty 1995). If recruitment variability is
modelled and interpreted as a consequence of ran
dom environmental effects the evaluation of long-
term strategic decisions should be based simply on
expected values, possibly corrected for risk attitudes,
or equilibrium analysis. If recruitment variability is
modelled as deterministic chaotic behaviour (Wil
son eta!. 1991, Wilson eta!. 1994) one might con
clude that active management intervention might,
at least in theory, remove some of the variability.
The different interpretations of recruitment vari
ability also affect the perceived role of the spawn
ing stock biomass. Some management agencies have
explicitly or implicitly modelled the variation in re
cruitment omitting the effects of stock size, thus
assuming that the size of the spawning stock can be
ignored in practical management (Hilborn and Wal
ters 1992). An extensive analysis of relationships
between spawning stock biomass and recruitment
suggests, however, that depletion of spawning stocks
can result in a decline in recruitment levels (Myers
et a!. 1995b). Thus the dynamics of the spawning
stock biomass should be included in the identifica
tion of key processes (Myers et a!. 1994).
My studies have shown that lack of knowledge
of stock and recruitment relationships can arise from
the assumptions made in the analysis of available
data on fish stocks. The choice of natural mortality
rate (I) and the assumed type of predatory interac
tions in models with species interactions (II) can
distort recruitment variability and so affect interpre
tations of the stock recruitment data. Later studies
(Bradford and Peterman 1989, Lapointe et a!. 1989)
have confirmed the significance of the choice of
natural mortality rates. Multispecies assessments
have examined evidence for prey shifts and func
tional responses, but evidence falsi1ying the use of
the present model in the North Sea multispecies ana
lysis has not been found (ICES I 994b).
Several different models have been developed for
stock and recruitment data. Two or three parameters
have been used to describe a wide range of deter
ministic relationships between the spawning stock
and subsequent recruitment (Ricker 1954, Beverton
and Holt 1957, Shepherd 1982). Probabilistic models
have used discrete stock size and recruitment inter
vals (Getz and Swartzman 1981, Evans and Rice
1988). In the predictive recruitment modelling in
my studies, lack of knowledge was reflected in wide
ranges of parameter values (III) or in probabilistic
formulations (VI). For well studied fish stocks lack
of knowledge of recruitment patterns (Table 2) can
often be characterised as risk, i.e. it is possible to
state something about the probability distributions
of recruitment (VI, VII). For less well studied stocks
recruitment is a source of uncertainty.
4.3 From unit stock to communities
The unit stock has been a key concept in fisheries
science (Gulland 1983). It has imposed a uniform
ity constraint on the fish to be managed and has
restricted their interactions with the outside world
to single parameters. The concept has simplified
quantitative estimates and even the considerations
of management objectives and measures. An ana
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Table 2. Levels of recruitment variability
Context Measures of variability Source
Parameter uncertainty in Range of variability, ratio of high to low ifi
stock-recruitment model recruitment value: from 1.5 at low stock
levels to >2.5 at high stock levels
Variability of recruitment of Coefficient of variation (%) = 55 Myers et al. 1995a
sandeel in Shetland
n=16 (background for VI)
Empirical material (n=274) Coefficient of variation (%), range: 14 - 273 Myers et al. 1995a
Table 3. Dichotomies of perceptions of the ecological system, their appearance in different management prob
lems and examples of methods and assumptions. In each cell the dominant types of imperfect knowledge are
identified.
Stock characteristics Single species Community
Unchanging homogeneous unit stocks Problem: Problem:
Optimisation of exploitation, Management of interacting
quota management fisheries, trade-offs, gear
and entry restrictions
Methods: Methods:
Analysis of yield per recruit, Multispecies population
population analysis, stock- analysis, lumped parameter
recruitment, production production models
models
Assumptions: Assumptions:
- Fixed M - Part of M estimable
- Constant growth
- Constant growth
- Recruitment variability
- Recruitment variability
“external” mostly external
=> Risk, ignorance => Risk, uncertainty
Diverse, potentially evolving population Problem: Problem:
Artificial enhancement, Ecosystem management,
preservation of genetic biological diversity
diversity management
Methods: Methods:
Population genetic and Transformation models
evolutionary models for habitats/biotopes
Assumptions: Assumptions:
- Differences between Critical habitats/biotopes
individuals and driving variables
- Selection patterns cause identifiable
changes in population
parameters
=> Risk, uncertainty => Risk, uncertainty,
indeterminacy
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lysis of the models for unit stocks provides insights
into the knowledge used for management in its sim
plest form. But the unit stock is clearly not the only
possible way to examine the ecological basis of man
agement.
The entity for which knowledge is to be com
piled for management can be viewed in the dichoto
mies of single stock vs. community and unchanging
unit stock vs. evolving genetic population(s) (Table
3). In the table the upper left hand corner represents
“traditional” management, which until recently was
a driving force behind the development of manage
ment approaches and methods.
The ecological foundations of the original unit
stock concept are weak. There are several ways in
which the restricting assumptions can be relaxed.
The population genetic argument against the con
cept leads to a recognition that all fish are not equal
(Allendorf et at. 1987). In their simplest form, the
population genetic models deal with a single-locus
two-allele system (Kaitala and Getz 1995). Detailed
examination of these modelling approaches is
beyond the scope of this study, but I note that they
can provide a new perspective on exploitation pat
terns and levels. Moderately high fishing mortality
rates may turn out to be unsustainable because of
the selection pressure they exert on a nonhomoge
neous population (Nelson and Soule 1987, Kaitala
and Getz 1995).
The community ecological arguments against the
isolated unit stock have led to the development of
methods for multispecies assessments (Sissenwine
and Daan 1991). Fisheries research has tended to
focus on unit stocks and so has not systematically
collected information on changes in fish communi
ties. Such changes may then appear erratic and in
comprehensible. For example, stock replacement,
i.e. a shift in dominance in the fish community, can
not be fully analysed with data from research on unit
stocks (Daan 1980). Extensive research on unit stocks
spanning decades turns out to be insufficient even
for understanding changes in the abundance ofsingle
stocks (Daan et al. 1994, Serchuk et at. 1994). Yet
the consequences of major shifts in abundance are
significant from a management point of view.
An ecosystem approach to management regards
the ecological system to be managed as consisting
of several diverse and interacting populations. Com
petition, predation and evolutionary change are all
possible in such a system (Ryder et al. 1980). The
number of questions increases and therefore they
have to be answered with a broad brush. Attempts to
construct whole ecosystem models for management
purposes have met with scepticism, because the
number of implicit assumptions is large relative to
the amount of data available. At a conceptual level
they may, however, open up new avenues for dis
cussion. In fisheries management, the North Sea
model of Andersen and Ursin (1977) was seminal
for the work on more tractable multispecies virtual
population analysis methods.
An interesting question concerns the manner in
which imperfections of knowledge change when the
perspective shifts from the unit stock to a genetically
nonhomogeneous stock, multiple interacting stocks
or whole ecosystems. At a general level the imper
fections that dominate the knowledge of single unit
stocks can be characterised as risk and ignorance.
The risks arise from sampling and other data sourc
es and their effects can be calculated. Ignorance arises
from the deliberate exclusion of factors affecting
stock dynamics. When the management broadens to
non-homogeneous stocks or to multiple stocks, some
of the self-imposed ignorance is replaced by uncer
tainty but the sources of risk remain essentially the
same. Full evolutionaiy ecosystem management also
transfers some ignorance to uncertainty, but it also
expands indeterminacy. The possible pathways for
change are numerous and many of the possible cause
and effect relationships, e.g. the top-down versus
bottom-up control of ecosystem dynamics in the
Baltic Sea (Rudstam et at. 1994), are indeterminate.
5 Imperfect knowledge of fisheries
and the management advice
In many parts of the world scientists deliver man
agement advice through institutions specificly found
ed for this purpose. These institutions filter knowl
edge of fish stocks and fisheries and provide inter
pretations in the form of management recommen
dations. The focus is generally on the biological char
acteristics and population dynamics of the fish
stocks. This section investigates imperfections of
knowledge in the delivery of advice to managers.
First I address the conceptual boundaries that affect
the framing of management advice, second the rela
tion of different planning approaches to imperfect
knowledge in the advice, and third, the relation, if
any, between management advice and fish stock sta
tus.
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5.1 Conceptual boundaries in
management advice
In efforts to manage natural resources, the focus of
management advice is determined by the bounda
ries between the managed system and the outside
world. Such boundaries are not only the geographi
cal boundaries of the stock and their exploitation as
noted in subsection 4.1, but also the boundaries be
tween disciplines and issues. In a wider sense, all
decisions on system boundaries specify the extent
to which processes are regarded as parts of the sys
tem for which knowledge is needed and manage
ment measures devised. All knowledge will be in
terpreted in relation to these boundaries. The choice
of boundaries thus introduces and modifies imper
fections of knowledge.
5.1.1 Management advice beyond unit
stocks
Management advice for a unit stock exploited by a
sole “owner” (the manager) is conceptually simple.
For a sole owner whose only interest lies in the ex
pected yield in weight a maximum sustainable yield
is a valid objective. Scientists can focus on meas
ures such as recruitment, spawning stock biomass,
growth rate, fishing mortality rate and its distribu
tion over age groups to compile management ad
vice. The average yield can be used as a measure of
success as the variability does not matter. Given the
basic biological knowledge ofthe stocks as perceived
by the scientists, the management advice should then
be reasonably predictable. In (IV) I show that this is
indeed the case.
When the unit stock assumption is relaxed by in
troducing species interactions, the conditions for pro
ducing the management advice change along with
the perception of stock dynamics. Any reduction in
ignorance achieved by broadening the perspective
can thus increase uncertainty because many new
questions arise, for example, concerning the nature
of the species interaction (II). These uncertainties
are particularly important in simple systems in which
species interactions may have considerable impact
on the short-term dynamics of individual stocks.
Different advice will be delivered when possible
species interactions are taken into account. In a ret
rospective analysis the new perception of the stock
dynamics will therefore make the previous advice
seem inconsistent. The models for actual TAC rec
ommendations fit the multispecies data less well than
they do the single species data on those stocks whose
apparent dynamics have changed, e.g those of Bal
tic herring and sprat (Table 4). The models should,
however, only be taken as crude exploratory tools.
The processes of producing advice are likely to in
troduce non-linearities in the relationship between
variables. Thus models that include interaction terms
may display counterintuitive parameter values for
some variables. For example, the spawning stock
biomass ends up with a negative parameter value in
Baltic herring and North Sea cod (Table 4).
Simple management advice cannot be given when
the ecological basis of the management advice has
expanded to include communities, populations un
der selection pressure and whole ecosystems. As
noted above, the number of possible pathways mul
tiplies and there are no longer optimal solutions, only
different trade-offs based on subjective preferences.
Indeterminacy now enters management advice. Man
agers have not always found this helpful (Brugge
and Holden 1991). To reduce the indeterminacy,
boundary conditions such as a minimum viable pop
ulation size can be introduced. Explicit recognition
of trade-offs in the advice may also provide a way
of reducing the indeterminacy through stakeholder
negotiations. Now the relevant risks are not those
related to achieving a particular target but those of
violating boundary conditions.
5.1.2 Economic issues
In most parts of the world fish resources are exploit
ed by private actors, which may be individual fish
ers or firms. Thus a complex set of factors relevant
at the level of individuals determines the evolution
of a fishery (Hartwick and Olewiler 1986, Hanna
and Smith 1993, Gillis et al. 1995). Possible issues
are changes in market structure and the price of fish
or cost of fishing, including capital costs and varia
ble costs as well as subsidies and taxes (Flaaten 1988,
Conrad 1995). To be meaningful for management,
socio-economic aspects should be considered in re
lation to ecological features of the exploited popu
lations (Charles 1983, Plourde and Bodell 1984,
Flaaten 1988, III, Welch and Noakes 1991).
The inclusion of fish prices is a simple exten
sion of the biological models. The introduction of
prices raises, however, the issue of time prefer-
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ences with respect to income. Hence a discount rate
must also be included (Clark 1976). Clark (1973)
demonstrated that the discount rate can play a criti
cal role in determining the level of exploitation to
the extent that extinction can become “optimal”
from the point of view of the firms exploiting the
resource. The effects of the discount rate on the
exploitation of a resource are, however, complex
if the rate applies to society at large, because then
it influences the costs of fishing (Charles 1983,
Flanneson 1987). Although a universal discount rate
cannot be specified (Stiglitz 1994) an analysis of
possible discount rates can illustrate how time pref
erences translate into the way resources are exploit
ed, by affecting, among other things, decisions on
entry and exit and the preferred level of the resource
(III, Campbell et a!. 1993). It turns out that the dis
count rate can be important in determining the vari
ability of the value of a fishery even when the bio
logical variability is high and poorly known (III).
The time preference of income is only one aspect
of fishery economics. Complex ecological systems
permit many different types of response to changing
conditions. These responses then affect the success
of management alternatives (Fletcher et al. 1988,
Hilborn and Walters 1992). A detailed analysis of
these issues using e.g. production functions or game
theory is beyond the scope of this study. My em
pirical data on major Baltic Sea fisheries show,
however, that exploitation patterns change in re
sponse to economic conditions and that uncertain
ties concerning the future of a fishery can be miti
gated by increasing understanding of economic is
sues (VII). This finding also supports the claim that
concepts of economic risk and risk attitudes are
important in management (III, Pearse and Walters
1992). Thus a simple maximisation of the expect
ed yield in weight is no longer a valid measure of
sustainability. The probability and length of peri
ods of low income are important for the fishery
and its managers.
5.13 Expanding the fisheries sector
The introduction of socio-economic issues is only
one of many possible extensions. The choice of
boundaries between fisheries management prob
lems and other concerns is a decisive but subjec
tive step in setting the framework for management
advice. It is a value based judgement that cannot
be objectively determined. The problem can be seen
as an example of a dispute between world views in
a collective decision making context (Amy 1987,
Merkhofer 1987). Some actors see fisheries sim
ply as a biological or technical activity producing
catches of fish, whereas others would like to see
fisheries as part of a general environmental issue.
The significance of the choice is that it affects real
or perceived imperfections of knowledge concern
ing processes in the system to be managed (Friend
1989).
Traditionally, fisheries management has been
considered a separate activity from general aquatic
resource management and environmental protec
tion, but several tendencies have worked against
this division. The recognition that species interac
tions are relevant in fishery management (Mercer
1982, Flaaten 1988, Sissenwine and Daan 1991)
has raised the question of impacts of fisheries on
other ecosystem components (VI, European Com
mission 1995, Johnson and Martinez 1995). Con
cern for protected species and the need to conserve
biological diversity has added new elements to
management advice (Kimball 1993, Schnute and
Richards 1994, Lackey 1994, Martin 1994, Sher
man 1994, VI, VII). This process has probably been
encouraged by discussions within the fishery sec
tor demonstrating that objectives restricted to the
domain of high sustainable fish yields are too nar
row (see below, Jentofi 1985, Nielsen 1992, Charles
1992).
I have shown (VI) that the perspective on re
source management and the delivery of manage
ment advice changes as the field of management
broadens. A narrow definition of the fisheries sec
tor leads to self imposed-ignorance in fisheries
management advice. This ignorance matters, be
cause the managers have to act in a much broader
context than that covered by narrow advice. The
broader context, covering political, social, techni
cal and economic issues, is likely to affect many
societal decisions. Examples include those related
to environmental protection, as these may eventu
ally influence fisheries through restrictions. A
broadening of the boundaries permits new interest
groups to enter the discussions on fisheries man
agement, but unless the management advice is
broadened accordingly, the discussions will con
tain a large amount of uncertainty, ignorance and
indeterminacy.
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Table 4. Extended presentation of the simple linear models of IV. DF = degrees of freedom; Fand T= test sta
tistics; P= probability of accepting null hypothesis, SS = sum of squares, type Ill (SAS Institute 1989); Est.
parameter estimate; SE = standard error of estimate. The row under the subheadings (multispecies, single spe
cies) gives statistics for the whole model, also reported in IV. Other symbols as in subsection 3.1.
Baltic sprat
Analysis Multispecies Single species
R2=0.48; DF=1 1; F=4.08; P<0.05 R2=0.80; DF=1 1; F=18.9; P<0.001
ANOVA SS DF F P SS DF F P
F 4481 I 4.32 0.06 5278 1 13.9 0.005
F•SSB 8030 1 7.74 0.02 14366 1 37.8 0.000
Model parameters Est. SE T P Est. SE T P
Intercept 25 23 1.08 0.31 52 12 4.27 0.002
F -275 130 -2.10 0.06 -186 50 -3.73 0.005
F•SSB 1170 420 2.78 0.02 795 130 6.15 0.000
North Sea herring
Analysis Multispecies Single species
R2=0.81; DF=15; F=28.4; P<0.001 R2=0.80; DF=15; F=25.8; P<0.001
ANOVA SS DF F P SS DF F P
R 72749 1 8.08 0.013 56842 1 5.85 0.031
F•SSB 97191 1 10.8 0.006 61433 1 6.32 0.026
Model parameters Est. SE T P Est. SE T P
Intercept -61 41 -1.48 0.16 -22 38 -0.59 0.56
R 0.013 0.004 2.84 0.013 0.0086 0.003 2.42 0.031
FSSB 0.47 0.14 3.28 0.006 0.44 0.28 2.51 0.026
Baltic herring, subdivisions 27-29
Analysis Multispecies Single species
R2=0.55; DF=1 1; F=3.30; P<0.08 R2=0.70; DF=1 1; F=6.12; P<0.02
ANOVA SS DF F P SS DF F P
R 0.0032 1 3.69 0.091 0.0099 1 17.1 0.003
SSB 0.0040 1 4.63 0.064 0.011 1 18.4 0.003
R•SSB 0.0046 1 5.33 0.050 0.010 1 17.2 0.003
Model parameters Est. SE T P Est. SE T P
Intercept 0.65 0.21 3.06 0.16. 2.2 0.44 4.87 0.001
R -0.016 0.0084 -1.92 0.091 -0.18 0.044 -4.13 0.003
SSB -0.31 0.14 -2.15 0.064 -2.0 0.48 -4.29 0.003
R•SSB 0.014 0.0059 2.31 0.050 0.19 0.046 4.15 0.003
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Table 4, continued.
North Sea cod
Analysis Muitispecies Single species
R2=0.70; DF=14; F8.61; P<0.003 R2=0.65; DF=14; F=1 1.31;
P<0.002
ANOVA SS DF F P SS DF F P
F 1586 1 10.7 0.008
SSB 8722 1 8.82 0.013 7249 1 6.86 0.021
FSSB 7611 1 11.0 0.007
CATCH 2451 1 2.32 0.15
Model parameters Est. SE T P Est. SE T P
Intercept 1227 360 3.40 0.006 5.41 40.6 0.13 0.90
F -1493 460 -3.27 0.008
SSB -9.83 3.3 -2.97 0.013 0.735 0.281 2.62 0.021
FSSB 14.1 4.3 3.31 0.007
CATCH 0.373 0.245 1.52 0.15
Baltic cod
Analysis Multispecies Single species
R2=0.36; DF=10; F=5.06; P<0.05 R2=0.40; DF=10; F=6.00; P<0.04
ANOVA SS DF F P SS DF F P
SSB 7195 1 5.06 0.051 7997 1 6.00 0.037
Model parameters Est. SE T P Est. SE T P
Intercept 109 42 2.61 0.028 98.8 42 2.35 0.043
SSB 135 60 2.25 0.051 158 65 2.45 0.037
5.2 Treatment of imperfect knowledge in
advice
The recognition that fisheries and their management
are not a biological activity alone but also a form of
social planning brings economic variables, private
actors and new sources of imperfect knowledge into
the management process (Clark 1973; 1976, Hart-
wick and Olewiler 1986, Hilborn and Walters 1992,
III, VI, Stephenson and Lane 1995). The non-bio
logical knowledge that is relevant for resource man
agement can be specified. In (VII) I showed that
this knowledge is available, but we have to ask how
this additional knowledge influences management
advice and how imperfections in that knowledge can
be dealt with. To answer these questions it is neces
sary to refer to the different views of fisheries man
agement as planning (Fig. 1).
Different planning approaches make different
demands on knowledge but, in addition, the advice
is implicitly expected to deal differently with im
perfections of knowledge. Ideal synoptic planning
is preoccupied with facts and does not readily rec
ognise imperfections of knowledge; management
advice aims at predefined decisions and any knowl
edge that has no direct bearing on these decisions is
useless. Management according to synoptic planning
can deal with imperfect knowledge that can be ex
pressed as quantitative risk estimates in calculations
of expected values. Uncertainty that explicitly leads
to the compilation of new facts can also be handled.
Other types of uncertainty as well as indeterminacy
and ignorance do not fit conceptually into synoptic
planning:
Social incrementalism in the sense of Sager
(1990) is process oriented. A mixture of qualitative
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and quantitative knowledge can be used in the proc
ess, the end points of which are indeterminate. Un
certainties and indeterminacies are the fuel for the
communicative interactions that make up the plan
ning. In (VI) I showed that communication between
interest groups prompts questions that differ from
those usually faced by fisheries management. In
social incrementalistic planning management advice
should highlight options and possible avenues of
change rather than provide normative facts. Quanti
tative estimates of risk may lose a significant part
of their meaning when dominated by uncertainties
and indeterminacies. The determination of what is
significant knowledge becomes a matter of debate.
Taken to its extreme, the process can become a mer
ry-go-round that demands continuous input of new
knowledge only to keep up the momentum. Such
communication for the sake of communication is
not, however, what Habermas (1984) meant by com
municative rationality, which always aims at com
mon action.
5.3 The role of advice in achieving
sustainability
A compilation of actual advice for typical problem
stocks that I identified in (V) suggests that true im
provement in the status of a fish stock is a rare event
(Table 5). Recommendations to reduce the fishing
mortality rate tend to be repeated year after year.
For these stocks biologically based advice is unam
biguous: the fishing effort should be reduced. Yet
little improvement can be observed. This suggests
that there are fundamental conflicts between the
conservation and exploitation of fisheries resources
and that these conflicts are only weakly related to
imperfections in knowledge of the status of the fish
ery resources. In (V) I noted that improvement may
occur, but usually only after a crisis leading to e.g.
the complete closure of a fishery or some other such
a dramatic event. Only then do all actors appear able
to accept biological advice and take a reduction in
effort as a starting point for reopening the fishery.
As long as the situation appears bearable, imper
fections in knowledge of the stocks may be used as
an excuse for delaying action. One can argue that a
reason for the lack of action is “structural imperfec
tion” in the management advice, i.e. neglect of
knowledge outside the realm of the biological sta
tus of the fish stocks. Biologically based advice only
states the problem; it does not suggest how the prob
lem should be solved. The lack of action despite
unambiguous biological advice indicates that many
management problems are related to management
and stakeholder objectives, or lack of them. The fol
lowing section discusses objectives in greater de
tail.
Table 5. Distribution of fifteen years of recommenda
tion for selected stocks according to recommendation
categories. Recommendation: 0=unknown stock sta
tus, 1=status quo, 2=keep F, 3=reduce F, 4=reduce F
substantially, 5=build up stock or 0 catch. Stock codes
are given in Appendix 3. Data from ICES ACFM re
ports for 1978-1993 (Appendix 1).
Stock Recommendation category
0 1 2 3 4 5
cod2224 0 1 1 3 10 0
cod2532 0 0 3 1 9 2
codfarvbl 0 1 2 6 3 3
codiiia 0 6 0 4 5 0
codnearc 0 0 4 5 7 0
grhalsubl2 0 2 3 8 2 1
grhalvxiv 2 4 4 5 1 0
hadnearc 0 0 10 2 4 0
her2224 0 2 3 3 7 0
mackewes 0 0 3 7 5 0
plaiceviie 5 3 3 3 1 0
saitfarvb 1 1 5 3 5 0
saiticelva 0 0 12 3 0 0
saitnearc 0 0 7 6 3 0
salmbal 2 0 0 3 9 1
sebmarnear 0 11 1 3 1 0
sebmennea 0 4 3 7 2 0
soleviie 2 3 6 1 3 0
whitviia 0 4 4 2 5 0
6 Imperfect knowledge and
management objectives
Fisheries management is typically said to aim at
sustainability, but at a practical level this formula
tion has little meaning. With respect to imperfect
knowledge several related questions emerge. The
first refers to the objectives that determine the use
of management advice, in other words: what advice
is considered relevant? The second concerns the re
lationship between knowledge of the ecological sys
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tern and the objectives, and the third the manner in
which imperfect knowledge of objectives affects the
choice of means in management. All issues concern
ing objectives are closely related to conflicts between
stakeholders. In dealing with conflicts I shall assume
that their origin can be cognitive (instrumental
knowledge) or lie in interests and world views, in
cluding values (Amy 1987).
6.1 The nature of imperfect knowledge of
objectives
As a major producer of scientific advice for fisher
ies management, ICES has frequently commented
upon the lack of specified objectives (V). This does
not necessarily mean that there are no objectives.
They may appear to be lacking when they are so
conflicting that managers and other stakeholders
cannot agree on them. Alternatively, the actual ob
jectives may be too much in conflict with publicly
announced principles for resource use and thus stake-
holders do not wish to make them explicit. In both
cases those who deliver scientific management ad
vice face uncertainty, ignorance or indeterminacy
with respect to objectives. Forester (1993) argues
that objectives are often indeterminate in complex
social issues. Those who produce advice for deci
sion-makers do not know how it will be used and
may therefore give “wrong” advice. To avoid this
dilemma, without, however, solving it, producers of
biological advice have frequently adopted explicit
“biological” objectives (V). In a similar vein, Feld
man’s (1989) “bureaucratic analysts” keep on pro
ducing papers they know that nobody will use.
Without the imperfect knowledge of objectives,
the production and use of management advice would
be straightforward. One could then predict that only
stocks with very erratic dynamics would turn out to
be problematic for management. To test this pro
posal I examined all stocks for which ICES has re
cently provided advice, and for which the available
ecological knowledge meets basic quality criteria,
Assuming that the strictness of the advice reflects
the state of the stock, we can use this material to
find out if recruitment variability and other varia
bles can be associated with the general state of the
stock.
Recruitment variability, the price of the fish and
the total value of the catch were associated with the
strictness of the management advice (Table 6). On
its own, recruitment variability is only tentatively
related to the strictness of the management advice,
whereas the unit price of fish is clearly associated
with the strength of recommendations to reduce fish
ing mortality rates. The stocks for which recommen
dations to keep or accept the present fishing mortal
ity rates are made have a higher frequency of “cheap”
fish than those for which reductions are recommend
ed (Fig. 4). The high proportion of stocks of inter
mediately priced fish in the strong recommendations
reflects the large number of severely exploited
gadoid stocks.
The log linear models give some additional in
formation. They indicate that not only unit price
but also the interaction between unit price and to
tal catch value and that between unit price and re
cruitment variability are important (Table 7). In
teractions betwcen unit price and total resource
value are understandable. Small resources of valu
able fish may end up being overexploited as may
large resources of relatively cheap fish. A further
exploratory variable could be the distance from fish
ing ports and markets. For example, North-East
Arctic gadoid stocks are in a better shape than North
Sea stocks. The crudeness of the data and the sim
plicity of the models are not able to satisfactorily
model the variability in management advice as
shown by the likelihood ratios. The results never
theless strongly suggest that fairly simple, non-bi
ological factors determine the state of stocks. In
other words, sustainable use of resources does not
depend on ecological characteristics or the ecolog
ical knowledge of the stocks alone.
The conclusion of my analysis is that interests
and world views influence heavily the interpreta
tion and use of ecological “facts”. Historically it is
possible that a consensus of ignorance has led to the
overexploitation or destruction of renewable resourc
es (Howarth and Norgaard 1995). For the stocks
examined by ICES, however, this explanation is
unlikely; economic incentives compounded by so
cio-economic or political issues such as regional
equity are more plausible. Interviews with stakehold
ers can reduce some of the imperfections of knowl
edge that “hidden” agendas cause for those who pro
vide management advice. For example, Hildén and
Kuikka (1990) showed that different stakeholders
The question is, do those providing scientific man
agement advice have to worry about the imperfect
knowledge of objectives? If management is seen as
an exercise in synoptic planning, objectives are a nec
essary driving force. Without objectives the means
ends scheme of synoptic planning becomes mean-
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Table 6. Test statistics for associations between variables using table scores. n=sample size. Data in Appendix
2.
Variables associated with recommendation Cochran-Mantel-Haenszel DF Probability
categories (RECCAT) statistic for general association
between RECCAT and row
variable.
Recruitment variability class (RECRCLA); 10.165 6 0.118
n=296
Class of total value of catch (VALCLA); 10.025 6 0.124
n=3 19
Class of unit price of fish (PRICCLA); 73.173 4 0.001
n=3 19
PRICCLA controlling for RECRCLA; 71.047 4 0.001
n=296
PRICCLA controlling for VALCLA; 65.758 4 0.001
n=3 19
Table 7. Maximum likelihood analysis of variance based on fitted log-linear models and the likelihood ratios of
the models. Data in Appendix 2. Abbreviations as in Table 6.
Model (parameters omitted) Analysis of variance x2 DF Probability
RECCAT+PPJCCLA RECCAT 59.34 2 0.000
PRICCLA 26.69 2 0.000
LIKELIHOOD RATIO 72.72 4 0.000
n = 319
RECCAT+PRICCLA+ RECCAT 34.18 2 0.000
RECCAT*PRICCLA+ PRICCLA 13.90 2 0.001
PRICCLA*RECRCLA RECCAT*PRICCLA 57.68 4 0.000
PRICCLA*RECRCLA 58.56 4 0.000
LIKELIHOOD RATIO 11.93 16 0.749
n=296
RECCAT+ RECCAT 27.50 .2 0.000
RECCAT*PRICCLA+ RECCAT*PRICCLA 60.21 4 0.000
PRICCLA*VALCLA PRICCLA*VALCLA 38.29 6 0.000
LIKELIHOODRATIO 19.76 19 0.409
n=319
RECCAT+ RECCAT 21.59 2 0.001
RECCAT*PRICCLA+ RECCAT*PRICCLA 34.85 4 0.000
PRICCLA*RECRCLA PRICCLA*RECRCLA 26.60 6 0.000
LIKELIHOOD RATIO 66.94 55 0.130
n = 296
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Fig. 4. The distribution of price classes of fish with
categories of management recommendations.
ingless. If fisheries management is seen as an incre
mental social process stressing communication, ob
jectives are not necessarily set a priori, but at some
point they have to become explicit. Otherwise the
scientific information on the fish stocks and fisher
ies does not have a meaningful reference. In (VI) I
showed that neglect of relevant objectives led to a
management conflict that could not be solved with
out better knowledge of the way in which the differ
ent stakeholders viewed the management problem.
From the point of view of management advice the
immediate effect of the broader perspective on ob
jectives is that maximum sustainable yield of single
fish stocks is replaced by reference points that are
only indicative of directions of development (V).
cially in tropical regions, to regain simple objec
tives by analysing aggregate catches. Such aggre
gate objectives are, however, of doubtful validity in
complex systems. For example, Laloe and Samba
(1991) nOte that flexibility is a prominent feature of
artisanal fishermen. The suggestion is that fisher
men will readily respond to a number of signals in
the exploited fish community and other external
conditions such as those of the fish market; they will
not adhere to a single (aggregate) objective defined
in terms of catch. When one moves to whole eco
system management all possibilities for simple ob
jectives disappear.
Imperfections of knowledge are superimposed on
the structural complexity of the ecological system.
Lack of knowledge of the ecological system further
reduces the opportunities for unique objectives. Risks
are compatible with fixed predetermined objectives,
but uncertainties, indeterminacies and ignorance
concerning the ecological system make fixed objec
tives meaningless, even for the simplest of systems.
A fish pond owner cannot manage her pond for a
specific objective if she does not know what is go
ing on in the pond ecosystem. The replacement of
fixed objectives with biological reference points in
recent fisheries management advice implies a greater
acceptance of imperfect knowledge. The risks asso
ciated with the reference points can be calculated,
but the sensitivity of different risk estimators to the
assumptions (Cordue and Francis 1994) suggests that
what has been called risk is in fact uncertainty, and
too rigid a choice of risk estimators can lead to ig
norance. This means that imperfections of knowl
edge at different levels interact. We will also find
that uncertainty, indeterminacy and ignorance at the
level of the ecological system generally create inde
terminacies at the level of objectives.
6.2 Objectives and the ecological system
There is a close connection between the degree of
complexity of the ecological system and the con
ceivable objectives. Maximum yield can be used as
a dominant objective for a unit stock. A genetic stock
removes the possibility of simple optimisation be
cause at least two objectives are relevant: yields and
the maintenance of genetic diversity. The problem
of management is thus transferred to the sphere of
‘games of strategy” (Neumann and Morgenstern
1944). With the introduction of several species the
dimensionality of the objectives is likely to increase
even further. Attempts are sometimes made, espe
6.3 Imperfect knowledge of objectives
and the identification of means
Theoretically, fisheries managers have a wide range
of means at their disposal. Hilborn and Walters
(1992, p. 453) distinguish between the strategies
of fish stock management, which determine how
the catch taken from the fishery will be adjusted
from year-to-year, and the actual tactical decisions,
which set the rules for any particular year. Strate
gies and tactics deal with regulation, economic in
centives and active intervention in the resource
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base. Regulation is commonly divided into output
control, which is based on catch quotas, and input
control, which is based on some form of regulation
of the fishing effort through licensing or regula
tion of production through temporal, spatial or tech
nical restrictions or economic incentives. Economic
incentives can include subsidies or taxes and pay
ments or the creation of new markets such as indi
vidual transferable quotas. Fish stocking, pest con
trol and physical restructuring are examples of ac
tive interventions in the resource base. To what
extent is imperfect knowledge of objectives relat
ed to advice on choice of means?
In an instrumental mean-ends scheme only the
objectives are value driven (Forester 1993) and thus
the choice of means would be an optimisation ex
ercise once the objectives are known. Imperfect
knowledge of objectives complicates this kind of
optimisation. In (V) I showed that producers of in
strumentally oriented management advice have
demanded more explicit objectives, the idea being
that clearly expressed objectives would simplify
the production and delivery of management advice.
In a planning perspective this illustrates a strongly
instrumental view of management. When the per
spective shifts to include communicative rational
ity, means are also value laden. Agreement on what
is sustainable for a particular fish stock is not then
sufficient for guiding the production of manage
ment advice. Salmon management in the Baltic Sea
is a case in point.
The International Baltic Sea Fishery Commis
sion has agreed that safeguarding naturally spawn
ing salmon stocks is a key objective. In (VII) I
showed that, for all practical purposes, perfect
knowledge is available showing that this means a
substantial reduction in the fishing mortality rate.
With synoptic planning it would immediately be
possible to introduce whatever restrictions were
found necessary to reduce the mortality rates. Any
attempts to do so have, however, encountered sub
stantial difficulties, because the means available
to achieve the reduction are highly value laden. In
a synoptic view this could be interpreted as an in
dication of additional objectives such as the number
of fishers and the regional distribution of catches.
Scientists could solve the problem by taking these
additional objectives into account with the help of,
say, multi-attribute decision support. According to
this view, problems arise because knowledge of the
other objectives is less than perfect. Instrumental
synoptic management thus recognises, but does not
accept, uncertainty and ignorance with respect to
objectives. Indeterminacy has no place in this ap
proach except in the form of poorly defined opti
ma in relation to given objectives.
In a social, incrementalistic perspective it is
impossible to agree once and for all on well de
fined objectives. Knowledge of objectives remains
less than perfect because every choice is depend
ent on interests, world views, past events and chang
ing expectations. Conflicts cannot be neatly de
limited to a discussion concerning the ends of man
agement. Even if one could agree on a catch quota
for a region, decisions on who should take this quota
remain. Decisions on who will be able to fish may
actually influence prospects for reaching an agree
ment on the quota. Means and ends become intri
cately linked and the main task of management is
to reduce ignorance and resolve indeterminacies.
Stakeholder involvement thus becomes a key in
reducing imperfect knowledge concerning obj ec
tives. A social incrementalistic process demands
this type of interaction in the choice of means. The
task of management advice is then to facilitate and
provide input to the process by analysing alterna
tives. Statements restricted to a “preferred catch
level” or to observations that a stock is considered
to be within or outside “safe biological limits” re
flect instrumental rationality and are difficult to
reconcile with social incrementalistic view of fish
eries management. Such statements add relatively
little to an examination of alternative courses of
action.
The foregoing indicates that advice on means
cannot be separated from objectives and the plan
ning perspective. At a general level, output control
is mainly related to a synoptic planning perspec
tive whereas input control fits more easily in with
both social incrementalistic planning and synoptic
planning. The type of input control, however, ob
viously depends on the planning perspective. Syn
optic approaches call for a central power that de
termines the choice of input control based on
“objectively” calculated advice, whereas social in
crementalistic approaches can be founded on cul
tural processes based on stakeholder communica
tion and local enforcement.
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7 Decision support for sustainability
In the preceding sections 1 examined the appear
ance and role of different types of imperfect knowl
edge in fisheries management. In this concluding
section I return to sustainability and the question
of how fisheries scientists can deal actively with
imperfections in the knowledge used and present
ed in advice to managers. The task of the scientists
is demanding. Several studies have shown that the
human mind is susceptible to errors of judgement
when knowledge is imperfect (Tversky and Kah
neman 1974, 1981). Management advice and man
agerial decisions in fisheries are no exception.
A starting point for the discussion is that all as
pects of imperfect knowledge covered in the indi
vidual studies (I-Vll) and in this summarising ana
lysis can be relevant in management for sustaina
bility (Table 8). Their relative importance depends
on the management context, including the nature
of any management conflicts. The effects of im
perfect knowledge concerning boundaries, objec
tives and key processes as they appear in input vari
ables, parameters and model structure will depend
crucially on the type of management decision (I,
II) and on the particular characteristics of a fishery
(IV). Similar conclusions have been reached by
Bradford and Peterman (1989), Lapointe et al.
(1989) and Frederick and Peterman (1995). Ana
logous situations arise in water quality modelling
(Vans et a!. 1994). Thus it is not meaningful to
make general quantitative statements concerning
the relative contribution of different sources of im
perfect knowledge. Instead I first explore the role
of the management context and then use the con
clusions to examine some of the controversies con
cerning the prospects for sustainable fisheries. Fi
nally I offer possible quality criteria for manage
ment advice.
7.1 Interactions between imperfect
knowledge and the management context
A crude grouping recognises strategic and tactical
decisions (Table 9). In fisheries, strategic decisions
set the general rules for exploitation and usually
have a time horizon of several years. Tactical deci
sions are concerned with year to year, or sometimes
even seasonal, adjustments of the exploitation. An
important characteristic of a management decision
or plan is thus its temporal perspective. The dis
tinctions between strategic and tactical decisions
are, however, not alway clear cut. For example,
closed areas can be used at a strategic level, but
they can also be used as tactical decisions to direct
exploitation in the short term (Table 9).
7.1.1 Strategic decisions
The longer time horizons of strategic decisions re
duce the relative importance of numerically quanti
fiable risks. The chosen ecological perspective will
further affect the relative role of different imperfec
tions of knowledge (Table 10). The differences be
come particularly evident, when the general ecolog
ical perspective is combined with typical manage
ment decisions (Table 9). For example, restrictions
on access in a system managed as a whole ecologi
cal community are typically indeterminate. No
knowledge can, as such, give an unambiguous answer
on how the restrictions should be enforced. Further
more, even the quantitative level of the access limi
tation is indeterminate, as it depends on the type of
exploitation. On the other hand, access limitations
for a homogeneous fishery concentrating on a single
major stock are subject mainly to uncertainties and
risk. Similar differences arise in such matters as the
development of subsidies for different types of fis
hery.
The complex interactions between the temporal
and ecological perspectives, and the different kinds
of managerial decisions, can fuel conflicts and cre
ate confusion. Stakeholders will find imperfections
of knowledge at many different levels and exploit
them fully in identi’ing and evaluating strategic
decisions. For example lack of knowledge of eco
logical processes can be used as an argument for
retaining the status quo or for implementing spe
cific solutions. Both arguments were used in the
Shetland case (VI). In other situations socio-eco
nomic issues become a central argument. In a con
flict situation stakeholders can use lack of knowl
edge as an argument against any management ac
tion that does not serve their (perceived) interests
or correspond to their world views. The suggestion
is often that a reduction of risks and uncertainties
is the main task of the scientific advice.
Although many arguments in fisheries manage
ment tend to focus on what may superficially ap
pear to be risks and uncertainties, conflicts at a stra
tegic level can seldom be solved by overcoming
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Table 8. Summary with examples of different types of imperfect knowledge in different management tasks.
Management task Risk Uncertainty Ignorance Indeterminacy
Setting boundaries Deliberately Poorly specified Boundaries Evolving system
specified boundaries of based on flawed without
boundaries of resources and perception recognisable
system and their exploitation of system boundaries
fish resources
Specification of Multiple Unspecified Major actors Ongoing debate
objectives objectives weights for and interest on multiple
with weights multiple groups are objectives
objectives excluded
Identification of Sampling of Choice of Unrecognised Evolving
key processes variables variables and processes and processes
lack of data variables
Competing Competing model Lack of Future events
model specifications knowledge of determine course
specifications with nonin- possible models of events and
with prior formative prior appropriate
probabilities probabilities models
Evaluation of means Alternative Alternative Surprising Evolving system
and assessment of outcomes with outcomes with outcomes
outcomes prior probability noninformative
prior probabilities
Choice of Specification of Lack of concern
risk levels unacceptable risk for the
“unthinkable”
Random External events External events Choice of means
variability limit opportunities and attempted does not on its
affects for control control cause own specify
possibilities unexpected course of
for control effects development
in any way
such imperfections of knowledge. One reason is
that difficult ethical questions tend to emerge when
ever management becomes operational (Donaldson
1992). For example, the question of who should be
allowed to exploit a resource cannot be solved by
analysing risks and uncertainties. Ethical questions
are also encountered in the simplest of risk assess
ments. Even if the risks can be numerically calcu
lated, the question of what is considered an accept
able risk will still be a matter of debate.
These observations suggest that, from the man
agers’ point of vie ignorance and indeterminacy
are particularly relevant at the level of strategic
decisions. For fisheries scientists the situation easily
becomes frustrating. Scientists are trained to com
pile data and have developed methods for the trans
parent treatment of uncertainties and risks. How
ever, the risks and uncertainties are often interpreted
as proof of ignorance by those who feel that the
managers’ strategies make them losers. The over
all result may be a strengthening of indeterminacy.
The observation that conflicts involving fishers,
managers and politicians typically remain for long
periods at the status quo deplored by all stake-
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Table 9. Examples of tactical and strategic decisions in fisheries management.
Focus of Tactical Strategic
managerial
decision
Catch and - Yearly or seasonal quota - Quota strategy: Fixed F, fixed escapement,
distribution minimum stock biomass
of catches - Distribution strategy: First come - first served,
individual transferrable (share) quota, personal
permanent share, areally or temporally
distributed quota
- Risk level/degree of precaution
Effort - Short-term effort limitations: - Access regulation: Open access, licence,
days at sea, quantity of gear, transferrable licences.
closed seasons, varying closed - Permanent gear control (type/amount)
areas based on by-catch restrictions, - Permanent temporal and spatial restrictions
protection of young fish etc. - Risk level/degree of precaution
Resource - Number of fish to stock - Choice of species and stock
enhancement - Operational restoration - General stocking levels
- Restoration strategies
Development - Yearly management procedure - Management institutions and procedural rules
of fishery - Amount of taxation or subsidy - Type of taxation or other payment for resource ue
- Type of subsidy
- All above strategic decisions
Table 10. Types of imperfect knowledge in relation to the characteristics of planning and the resource system
Temporal Unit stock Evolving Multiple Community
perspective population stocks
in planning!
management
Short term Risk Risk, Uncertainty, Indeterminacy
uncertainty indeterminacy
Long term Risk, Uncertainty, Ignorance, Ignorance,
uncertainty ignorance uncertainty indeterminacy
holders, supports this conclusion.
The persistence of the status quo is shown by
findings concerning the use of management advice
(V. Table 5) and by an examination of the produc
tion and use of salmon management advice (Hildén
1990). Reducing uncertainties and risks through
improved knowledge of fish stocks or their exploi
tation may thus not bring any relief unless it is ac
companied by action that deals with ignorance and
indeterminacy. This is not simple when the reasons
for the ignorance and indeterminacy are poorly de
fined or unknown objectives, interests and world
views.
7.1.2 Tactical decisions
Short-term tactical management decisions tend per
se to be less sensitive to the overall perception of
the dynamics of a fishery and to other lack of knowl
edge than strategic decisions. The reason is simply
that short-term management decisions have a strong
tendency to aim at the status quo using simple pre
dictive models (Pope 1983). In systems comprising
a large number of species with partially overlapping
ecological functions, most models predict small
changes from year to year, and the systems appear
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to be resilient at an aggregate level. For these sys
tems lack of knowledge of say, species interactions
may be of minor concern in short-term decisions.
This is not true of systems dominated by a few pred
ators and prey with considerable fluctuations in year-
class strength (IV). In these fisheries short-term tac
tical decisions can have a decisive effect on the dy
namics of the fish community. Model uncertainty
including uncertainties related to species interactions,
is significant, because alternative perceptions of re
ality may lead to qualitatively or quantitatively dif
ferent short-term management advice (IV). Similar
changes may occur when new methods are intro
duced for estimating stock size, fishing effort or
mortality rates. Some of the variations in manage
ment advice shown by Table 5 are related to this
type of uncertainty.
As long as the status quo is a starting point, igno
rance and indeterminacy play a smaller role than
risk and uncertainty in tactical management deci
sions. The status quo neutralises, at least temporar
ily, many of the conflicts at the level of interests and
world views. If, however, managers attempt to use
short-term tactical decisions as part of a long term
strategy, then other types of imperfect knowledge
gain importance. In the Baltic Sea, for example,
many years passed before the International Baltic
Sea Fishery Commission could agree on quotas for
cod and salmon, showing that tactical decisions were
interpreted as having strategic importance. There
fore they also unleashed conflicts of interests and
world views.
7.2 Types of imperfect knowledge and the
sustainability controversy
The collapse of many large pelagic stocks in the
I 960s and 1 970s has been explained by referring to
the tragedy of the commons (Hardin 1968) and the
concurrent neglect of proper scientific advice (GuI
land 1987, Rosenberg et al. 1993). This line of
thought suggests that sustainability could have been
achieved if biologically based management advice
had been taken. Alternatively one can argue that
overexploitation is inevitable because there is no
consensus on the state of resources (Ludwig et al.
1993) or because the wrong type of management
has been proposed by biologically based scientific
assessments using a flawed paradigm (Wilson et aL
1994).
The arguments concerning the nature of fisher
ies management problems have a fundamental im
pact on the perception of decision support for re
source management. If current fisheries science can
not provide guidance for sustainable use, a major
reorientation of the research effort is called for. If,
on the other hand, non-sustainable exploitation is
mainly a problem of communication, the main em
phasis should be on the education of decision-mak
ers and on promoting discussion between stakehold
ers.
The sustainability controversy can be set in per
spective by examining the role of imperfect knowl
edge in relation to the ecological and planning as
pects of management. For managers, the justifiabil
ity of assumptions concerning the dynamics of the
resource (single unit stock, evolving populations,
limited number of interacting species, or whole com
munities) is a central ecological aspect. Planning is
closely related to the type of feasible control and
decision-making. Synoptic instrumental planning
suggests full control of both ecological and socio
political variables, whereas social incrementalistic
planning represents the conceptual opposite.
Using the different concepts of imperfect knowl
edge, I suggest that those who argue that present
fisheries science and management cannot achieve
sustainability, are claiming that ignorance is the key
problem. Managers cannot do the right thing because
knowledge of all relevant variables is not available
and cannot even be made available. In other words:
fisheries managers are unable to act as synoptic plan
ners. Those who see sustainability as a difficult, but
nevertheless attainable goal point out that risks, and
to some extent, uncertainty are the dominant prob
lems, and that fisheries science is learning to ad
dress them. Here, too, synoptic planning is an im
plicit assumption. Scientists direct their advice to
managers or decision makers, who are assumed to
be able to control exploitation if they “want to”. The
questions are then: what evidence is available to
support the different claims and what management
situations produce the evidence?
As subsection 7.1 shows, risks often dominate
short- and intermediate term tactical resource man
agement decisions concerning well researched fish
stocks. About 60 of the fish stocks assessed by the
International Council for the Exploration of the Sea,
or half of the total stocks, fall in this category (ICES
1 994a). For these, risks can be quantified (Vans et
al. 1993, Rosenberg et al. 1993, VII) and set in rela
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tion to specific reference points (V). However, few
of these stocks provide opportunities for truly syn
optic planning. In reality, managers’ control over
exploitation is often weak and to justify their ac
tions they have to negotiate with and convince nu
merous stakeholders. This is foreign to synoptic plan
ning. which, by definition, is conflict free at the lev
el ot’values and world views, and which would deal
with e.g. risks in the form of unidimensional ex
pected utilities. The necessity of negotiations hints
at indeterminacy and ignorance, allowing for value
conflicts between stakeholders. The question, risk
to whom, becomes a complement to any unidimen
sional risk assessment. As long as risk and uncer
tainty dominate over ignorance and indeterminacy,
synoptic planning can, however, be used as a con
ceptual reference, and systematic analyses of the
resources and their (potential) variability can sup
port decisions towards sustainability.
Ignorance and indeterminacy are generally domi
nant in long-term strategic decisions and all deci
sions concerning poorly investigated and understood
resources (V). In the case of ICES (1994a), half the
stocks were in a category for which no, or only un
satisfactory, quantitative estimates were available.
In long-term decisions ignorance and indetermina
cy arise partly because of lack of understanding of
long-term changes in the resource, but also because
of the interaction of different historical trends caus
ing unanticipated changes. These situations do not
even remotely correspond to synoptic planning. For
example, problems related to Finnish salmon man
agement can, with hindsight, be attributed to a his
torical development involving decisions on owner
ship of waters and fishing rights, subsidies for rural
occupations and general rural policy, exploitation
of rivers for hydro power, artificial stocking and in
stitutional solutions within the fisheries administra
tion (Nybacka eta!. 1991). An additional aspect of
ignorance is its subjective nature. Separation of fish
eries management from other environmental man
agement issues has in the past led to a self-imposed
ignorance about other values; the outcome may be
serious conflict (VI).
A formal risk analysis may give a false sense of
security and controllability when ignorance and in
determinacy are dominant. More useful decision
support is based on precaution, for which criteria
and rules of thumb can be specified (Garcia 1994,
FAQ 1995a), or an adaptive approach (foiling
1978, Walters 1986), which can gradually reduce
ignorance and indeterminacy. When ignorance and
indeterminacy are dominant, scientists cannot give
a priori quantitative estimates of the degree of pre
caution. Quantitative risk analysis as advocated by
Rosenberg et a!. (1993) can provide additional in
sights but cannot resolve the fundamental problems
of management. The problems are not due to risks
but to issues connected with collective decision
making, power, legitimacy ofmanagement and flex
ibility in the face of changing conditions.
The conclusion of this discussion is that the two
seemingly opposite arguments concerning the role
of science in supporting sustainable fisheries man
agement and its capacity to do so focus on differ
ent types of situations. These differences arise at
ecological, socio-economic, political and scientific
levels. At the ecological level the stocks for which
risk analyses are relevant characteristically have a
sufficient dominant or independent role in the eco
system. Scientists and managers can therefore treat
them as unit stocks. The opposite conditions pre
vail in exploited ecosystems with numerous stocks
interacting in many ways. At the socio-economic
level the stocks whose management benefits from
risk analyses are distinguished by well defined and
controllable fleets with considerable investments
in the fishery. The other end of the scale is repre
sented by a wide range of small-scale exploiters,
who are an anonymous crowd from the point of
view of centrally appointed managers. Sophisticated
risk analyses have little meaning for this type of
fisheries. Instead, community-based management
may be the key to sustainability. At the scientific
level the available data and understanding of the
stock determine the differences. Quantitative risk
analyses have little to say when next to nothing is
known about the stock(s). The scientific level in
teracts with the two other sources of differences. It
is easier to obtain good data from large dominant
stocks exploited by well defined fleets than from
numerous small stocks exploited by a wide range
of fishers.
My analysis shows that approaches to sustaina
bility cannot have universal validity. Systematic
analysis of the imperfections of knowledge and
sources of conflict can, on the other hand, provide
a coherent and simple explanation as to why deci
sion support for management can fail to improve
the status of the fish stocks. Thus Wilson et a!. ‘s
(1994) assumption of deterministic chaos is not
needed in an evaluation of management paradigms
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and relevant decision support. Careful analysis of
the true nature of imperfect knowledge is, how
ever, necessary. If scientists or managers confuse
the different types of situations, problems are in
evitable. Too strong an emphasis on ignorance or
indeterminacy when controllability is reasonable
leads to confusion and inefficient use of available
knowledge. Presentation of knowledge as if syn
optic planning were feasible, when an incremen
talistic approach is the only one appropriate, may
lead to serious errors in managerial decisions.
7.3 Decision support, interactions of
imperfect knowledge and collective
choice
Providing support for resource management would
be easy if all problems could be neatly categorised
so that optimal solutions could be found for each
type vis-d-vis decision support. My study, the cas
es examined and the review of the relevant litera
ture have shown that management for sustainabil
ity is characterised by complex combinations of
risk, uncertainty, ignorance and indeterminacy in
teracting with different conflict dimensions. Igno
rance and indeterminacy come on the scene even
though accumulated wisdom indicates that the
management issues can be handled in a quantita
tive risk framework. For example, the discovery of
a syndrome affecting reproductive success of the
Baltic salmon (ICES 1994a) made earlier assess
ments of sustainable exploitation meaningless.
Another example is technological innovations in
fishing, which introduce indeterminacy into the
implementation of specific management measures
(Suuronen 1995).
The interactions of different types of imperfect
knowledge complicate the question as to the kind
of support one can demand for resource decisions
aiming at sustainable use of natural resources
(Charles 1994, VII). An obvious starting point is
that all decisions that can significantly affect the
utilisation of resources should be based on “best
available knowledge”. The UN Convention on the
Law of the Sea demands “best scient(flc evidence
available” (United Nations 1983, my italics), but
this analysis and the underlying studies (V VI) have
shown that instrumental scientific rationality may
not be sufficient in conflict-laden resource deci
sions in the face of risk, uncertainty, ignorance and
indeterminacy.
My study indicates that the multidimensionali
ty of the problem of imperfect knowledge precludes
universal solutions. Efforts to reduce imperfections
of knowledge will depend on the role of manage
ment in a planning perspective. In fisheries man
agement, the decision analysis includes collective
decision-making with incompatible world views
(von Winterfeldt and Edwards 1986, Merkhofer
1987). Arrow’s impossibility theorem states that
there are no rules of social choice that could solve
the problems and at the same time satisfy four gen
erally accepted properties of rationality and democ
racy (Sen 1988). This led Sager (1990) to suggest
that a trade-off between some of the properties,
notably a compromise between logicality and fair
ness, is necessary. However, before rushing to this
conclusion we should examine the conditions of
Arrow’s theorem and the properties of resource
management planning.
Sen (1982) distinguishes between different kinds
of aggregation in collective decisions. Much of fish
eries management is an exercise that demands the
aggregation of individual interests into social de
cisions. Fisheries managers deal with interests that
can at least partly be measured on a common scale,
as shown by the Shetland case (VI). The classical
framework of the impossibility theorem does not
seem appropriate for this type of problem and Sag
er’s (1990) compromise may not be necessary. In
stead, bargaining becomes an issue. Only certain
special cases of strategic fisheries management may
be subject to the full gloom of Arrow’s theorem.
Examples include the choice between different fish
eries policies, e.g. should recreational fisheries be
favoured over commercial fisheries? Such a deci
sion involves an aggregation of individual welfare
judgements to a collective decision. Fairness will
be an important criterion for decisions of this type.
What do the foregoing points of view mean for
the decision support that scientists are asked to pro
vide for fisheries management? One observation
is that the stalceholders in fisheries management
will seldom be able to accept normative statements
of the correct solution as a basis for decisions.
Bargaining is an important part of management and
therefore the decision support should give stake
holders a chance to examine the consequences of
different options. To facilitate the bargaining, stake
holders and scientists may be able to agree on the
type of knowledge that is needed and also on the
criteria that the decision support should meet. This
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will obviously not stop different stakeholders from
arriving at different conclusions when they use the
material provided by scientists.
7.4 Quality criteria for decision support
Keeney and Raiffa (1976) proposed the following
criteria for examining the quality of decision trees:
completeness, operationality, decomposability, ab
sence of redundancy and minimum size. These qual
ity criteria are applicable to knowledge serving in
strumental rationality and means-end schemes.
Merkhofer (1987) suggested that decision-aiding
approaches for social risk management can be eval
uated by considering a broader set of quality crite
ria: logical soundness, completeness, accuracy,
practicality and acceptability. Of these, logical
soundness, or rather consistency, completeness and
accuracy refer to instrumental rationality in the
management of natural resources. Practicality and
acceptability also include communicative ration
ality. Both instrumental and communicative ration
ality appear to be necessary to cover the full range
of questions and situations that arise in efforts to
achieve sustainability.
The findings of my study support a combined
list of quality criteria for management advice:
—. Completeness
— Parsimony (absence of redundancy)
— Logical consistency (soundness)
— Accuracy
— Practicality
— Transparency
— Neutrality
I have excluded acceptability as a criterion of
management advice since acceptability is something
that can be sought in the management process, be
fore or after managerial decisions. Acceptability
cannot be required of the advice a priori. Advice
immediately accepted by all stakeholders is not really
advice at all, only a confirmation of past actions and
prejudices. Instead I introduce neutrality as a crite
rion. It is based on the observation that indetermi
nacy is important in fisheries management. The ad
vice cannot as such resolve this indeterminacy, but
it can provide input into the collective processes that
choose courses of action. To achieve this it must
avoid creating or enhancing conflicts by presenting
one-sided views or by rejecting alternatives without
justification. The criterion is coined neutrality rath
er than objectivity because it is not a question of
rejecting subjective statements. Instead this criteri
on demands a fair presentation of different and pos
sibly conflicting subjective conclusions. Neutrality
of advice may thus be a prerequisite for acceptabil
ity.
The completeness criterion is highly demand
ing in fisheries science. Many reference points and
approaches have been developed for the biological
subsystem (Smith et al. 1993, Hutchings and My
ers 1994, Myers et al. 1994, Caddy and Mahon
1995), but in (VII) I argue that this is not suffi
cient. The biological reference points cover only a
limited part of the system to be managed. Further
more, lack of knowledge of the status of the re
source in relation to the biological reference points
may give an inconclusive assessment where other
variables could give a better evaluation and rank
ing of management options. The crisis in the Ca
nadian Atlantic cod fishery supports this argument.
In the Newfoundland cod fishery the biological
reference points were so uncertain that managers
were receiving ambiguous signals almost up to the
moment the fishery collapsed (Doubleday 1993,
MacKenzie 1995) whereas socio-economic infor
mation had already shown clearly in the I970s that
any management decision leading to an increase
of fishing effort would worsen the situation for the
fisheries (Copes 1983). My own findings that the
state of the resource, as revealed by the strength of
the recommendation, is related to economic varia
bles also point to the importance of variables out
side the biological realm (subsection 6.1). Results
showing that better biological analysis would have
revealed the true situation (Hutchings and Myers
1994) do not invalidate the finding that several types
of reference points are needed for proper evalua
tion of management options (VII).
The problem with the completeness criterion is
that the number of variables that have some bear
ing on the sustainability of fisheries and that are or
can be measured exceeds the capacity of any actor
in the resource management process. The parsimo
ny criterion demands removal or aggregation of re
dundant variables. It is not possible to state uni
versally how the aggregation should be carried out
or how many variables should be retained. Olli
Vans (Helsinki University of Technology, person
al communication) has pointed out that this amounts
to finding the correct level of resolution, which may
or may not be achieved through aggregation. The
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issues depend on the context, and different levels
of aggregation are appropriate for different deci
sions, e.g. strategic decisions on the control of ef
fort and tactical decisions on the next year’s quota
demand different resolution.
The logical consistency criterion requires that
the advice follows logically from stated premises.
This criterion is demanding because there are com
peting theories concerning both the ecological sys
tem and the development of the fishery. As scien
tific advice is generally produced in a process that
combines objective calculations and subjective
judgements, that advice may be inconsistent.
The accuracy criterion is a double-edged sword.
I noted above that demands for accurate knowl
edge can be made indefinitely. The criterion must
therefore be viewed in the light of the consequenc
es of the decision. The reversibility of the conse
quences is a particularly apt reference. If the con
sequences may be irreversible, the demands placed
on accuracy will be greater than they would be if
all consequences were easily reversible. By stat
ing and justif’ing the chosen level of accuracy,
scientists can recognise the accuracy criterion with
out succumbing to demands for the endless collec
tion of minutiae. Accuracy also means that the vari
ables used in the methods for assessing the state of
the fish stocks and the fishery accurately reflect
what they are thought to measure. For example,
there are several ways of measuring fishing effort,
from days at sea to hours of fishing, and their rela
tion, if any, to the fishing mortality rate may differ
substantially. This is critical when the development
of fishing effort is being estimated or when advice
on appropriate fishing effort is delivered.
The practicality criterion recognises the possi
bilities and limitations of fisheries management.
In the Baltic Sea, the fish community and fisheries
alike could benefit from biomanipulation that would
reduce the stocks of sprat (Rudstam et al 1994);
but the advice to increase fishing for sprat is use
less as long as there are no markets capable of ab
sorbing the products of an extensive sprat fishery.
Transparency is a key to stakeholder participa
tion. The reasoning behind the advice must be un
derstandable. In addition, transparency requires ex
plicit recognition of lack of knowledge (Smith et
al. 1993). My study has provided three justifica
tions for an analysis of lack of knowledge in the
identification of means and the assessment of out
comes. First, the analysis can provide insights into
how lack of knowledge and its subjective resolu
tion in, say, models can distort the perception of
reality and interpretations of observations (I, II,
Lapointe et al. 1989). Second, it permits an initial
assessment of the feasibility of management deci
sions. For example, in the case of the Shetland Is
lands, uncertainties with respect to recruitment, on
which the fishery is largely dependent excludes
quota management (VI). Third, an assessment of
the lack of knowledge of consequences gives a full
er understanding of the limits of management, i.e.
the controllability of the system. For many com
plex systems, the actual possibilities of control are
often limited to crude directional control relative
to the present. It may, for example, be possible to
state that scrapping subsidies will decrease the fish
ing effort rather than increase it, but the magnitude
of the change cannot be determined with any rea
sonable accuracy.
7.5 Applying the criteria
When the focus of decision support goes beyond
instrumental synoptic planning with criteria for
practicality, transparency and neutrality, the deci
sion support can no longer be separated from the
institutional framework for management. Ideally,
management institutions should create incentives
to reduce ignorance, uncertainty and indetermina
cy (Pearse and Walters 1992). Ignorance arises es
pecially from the interaction of different types of
imperfect knowledge, and is often fuelled by con
flicts related to different world views. Therefore
the first step towards improved knowledge involves
a broad definition of actors and interest groups
coupled with opportunities for participation. This
may require changes in the way management deci
sions are taken.
A detailed analysis of how different institution
al arrangements can support participatory fisher
ies management is not the task of this study. I sim
ply note that in democratic societies broad stake-
holder participation appears to be the only way to
reduce indeterminacy concerning objectives and to
increase acceptability of advice. Furthermore, the
multidimensionality of complex issues effectively
blurs the difference between lay and expert knowl
edge (Wynne 1996). For example, a biologist who
is an expert in the dynamics of fish populations is
often a lay person when it comes to the operation
of fishing gear or functioning of fish markets. Ac
cepting communicative rationality can, paradoxi
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cally, allow a strengthening of instrumental resource
management, i.e. a move from ignorance to uncer
tainty and risk. This should make managers move
towards what Schon (1983) calls the “reflective
practitioner”. On the other hand, fixation on instru
mental synoptic planning as a model for all fisher
ies management is likely to produce additional sup
port for Ludwig et a!. ‘s (1993) pessimistic conclu
sion on the inevitability of overexploitation.
Examination of the criteria in actual manage
ment advice suggests the following. Short-term bio
logical advice in the format provided by e.g. the
Advisory Committee on Fishery Management
(ACFM) of ICES (1996) fulfils many of the crite
ria. ACFM gives information on the main charac
teristics of the state of the stock and the fishery,
and provides explanatory notes on any lack of
knowledge. ACFM also provides material that al
lows for an examination of options in biologically
oriented short-term tactical managerial decisions.
The persistent problems of many fish stocks and
fisheries suggest, however, that the main problems
are found at a strategic level (Table 5). The pro
duction of knowledge for strategic managerial de
cisions is much weaker, being restricted to general
statements on trends and to biological reference
points. Individual examples of comprehensive
analyses can be found, but the decision support is
often severly limited in scope and unable to meet
more than a few of the quality criteria. Developing
both the institutional setting and the decision sup
port for strategic decisions in fisheries is likely to
be one of the keys to sustainability in fisheries.
8 Conclusions
Management of fishery resources cannot avoid deal
ing with risk, uncertainty, ignorance and indetermi
nacy. These imperfections of knowledge are rele
vant in the different tasks in the management proc
ess. They affect the setting of boundaries, the spec
ification objectives, the analysis of key processes,
the identification of options, the choice of means
and the assessment of outcomes. They interact and
stakeholders exploit them in conflicts concerning
managerial decisions to turn decisions in particular
directions. The conflicts can confuse the different
types of imperfection. Stakeholders find it. for ex
ample, easy to raise doubts about ecological sys
tems, and thus conflicts may appear to focus on
knowledge of the fish communities, even when con-
flicts concerning interests and world views would
be more important. Those who provide material to
support managerial decisions may end up providing
irrelevant details if they do not grasp the true nature
of the missing knowledge.
It is possible to systematically examine imper
fections of knowledge and sources of conflict in fish
eries. My study has shown that this must be done
through all the tasks of the management process if
the problems of management for sustainability are
to be correctly understood. The diversity of the im
perfections of knowledge also means that it is not
possible to use a single method or methodology in
the analysis. Instead combinations of qualitative and
quantitative approaches have to be used.
Management advice can deal with some of the
problems associated with risks, uncertainties, igno
rance and indeterminacy. It can estimate risks, iden
tif,’ and reduce uncertainties, develop contingency
plans and adaptive processes to deal with ignorance
and also provide background material for a resolu
tion of indeterminacies. To meet these demands the
management advice must address several disciplines
and flexibly perceive the interactions between dif
ferent management tasks. If those providing advice
choose too narrow a focus they will find themselves
victims of self-imposed ignorance. The connections
between disciplines are inherent in all attempts to
specif3i sustainable development.
Sustainable development comprises ecological,
economic and cultural sustainability. Management
advice that improves the understanding of the fish
resources and their dynamics is necessary for an in
strumental approach to ecological sustainability. This
study has shown that progress towards sustainabili
ty cannot universally be based on the idea of synop
tic planning. Synoptic planning would amount to
treating the management of fisheries as if it were a
control theory problem. Only special cases, such as
short term managerial decisions concerning well
defined stocks with few exploiters or fish pond man
agement, can come close to the synoptic ideal. Nor
mally the large number of stakeholders and the po
tential for conflict in different dimensions of knowl
edge, interests and world views force the manage
ment process towards social incrementalism. The
large spectrum of world views and values defies
synoptic control. Communicative rationality has to
be accepted as a potential driving force, especially
in the preparation of strategic managerial decisions.
This is essential as willingness to take strategic de
cisions appears to be a precondition for sustainabil
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ity. Otherwise the deadlock of status quo is likely to
remain.
When management advice becomes part of a
process that recognises communicative rationality,
the decision support cannot be prescriptive in the
sense of unambiguous presentations of single opti
ma. Management will involve negotiations that, at
best, take into account the constraints imposed by
the biological system. This analysis and its support
ing studies have examined some approaches and
tools for dealing with imperfections in knowledge
of the ecological systems which fisheries exploit. I
have shown that risk analyses on their own are un
likely to bring much relief except when all other
sources of imperfections of knowledge have been
greatly reduced. If other imperfections of knowledge
are neglected, a risk analysis may create a false sense
of security and address minor issues that cannot lead
the exploitation towards sustainability.
Quality criteria for sustainability-oriented man
agement advice can be derived by examining com
binations of planning theory, ecological theory and
an analysis of conflicts. The criteria ensure that the
advice meets instrumental demands concerning
management measures, but they also take into ac
count the communicative rationality that is needed
to deal with imperfections of knowledge, which
otherwise may foster conflicts. As our knowledge
of ecological systems is far from perfect, ecological
issues have to be dealt with at both an instrumental
and a communicative level. Many of the frustrations
experienced by the producers of fisheries manage
ment advice may be due to too strong an emphasis
on the instrumental level.
My study has focused on issues that arise in deal
ing with imperfect knowledge in fisheries manage
ment aiming at sustainability. It has identified the
connections between management as a planning ac
tivity and the key ecological concepts of exploited
fish resources. Its emphasis has been on a conceptu
al clarification of relevant issues, using the support
ing studies as cases to illustrate different points in a
vast field. Additional studies are needed to develop
and apply methods that meet the criteria of proper
decision support in fisheries management, at the level
of strategic decisions in particular. Universal solu
tions are unlikely as soon as non-instrumental ra
tionality is accepted. The management of and man
agement advice for major fish stocks in the Baltic
Sea are, and have to be, different from those con
cerning coastal artisanal fisheries or lake fisheries
dominated by recreational fishers, even though sus
tainability is a common objective. The challenge of
methodological development is flexibility and sen
sitivity to context.
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Sammandrag
Den centrala frgestallningen i detta arbete galler
fiskerivetenskapens roll vid frvaltning av fisk
resurser och styrning av fisket. En utgãngspunkt är
att bade internationella och nationella málsättnin
gar later forsta att forvaitningen av fiskresurser strä
var mot en hâllbar utveckling. I verkligheten är
manga fiskerier lângt fran detta ideal. En del fors
kare havdar att hãllbar utveckling omojligt kan
uppnàs eftersom okunskapen om fiskresurserna r
stor samtidigt som ekonomiska intressen driver
fram en hard exploatering av resurser. Bristen pa
kunskap betyder att fOrvaltningen inte hinner reg
lera utnyttjandet innan det är fOr sent. Vissa pessi
mister hävdar torn. afl de biologiska modeller som
fOrvaltningen stdder sig pa antingen saknar grund
eller bygger pa direkt felaktiga antaganden. Mer
optimistiska forskare anser art den metodologiska
utveckling som skett mom fiskerivetenskapen kan
producera battre rád fOr fOrvaltningen. FramfOr allt
har forskningen utvecklat metodik som ger fdrvalt
ning och intressegrupper en mojlighet art battre an
hittills analysera risker vid förvaltningsbeslut t.ex.
under forhandlingar om fiskekvoter.
I detta arbete har jag närmat mig argumenten
kring fOrvaltningsproblemens natur genom att ana
lysera var bristen pa kunskap om fiskresurser och
fiskerier uppstàr. Bristen pa kunskap kan galla fo
randringar i fiskbeständen, t.ex. fiskynglens Over
levnad, eller konsekvenser av fOrvaltningsbeslutfOr
sjalva fisket. Nya begransningar i fisket kan exem
pelvis ha överraskande effekter. FOr att kunna dis
kutera frãgor kring kunskapsbristen i detalj har jag
använt en kategorisering av bristen pa kunskap. I
detta arbete beskriver begreppet risk situationer
dã de mojliga konsekvenserna eller handelserna är
kanda samtidigt som deras sannolikhet kan bestam
mas. Dá osdkerhet rader är de mOjliga handelserna
eller konsekvenserna kända, men deras sannolik
het okand. Okunskt.ip betecknar situationer da man
inte ens kanner till de mOjliga händelserna eller
konsekvenserna. Obestamdhet fOrekommer dk fle
ra alternativa handelseforlopp r mOjliga medan
avgorandet mellan dem bestäms av framtida han
delser.
All fiskerifiirvaltning strävar till att styra utnytt
jandet av ekologiska processer. Kunskapen om de
ekologiska processerna i fiskbestánd och fisksam
hallen är inte perfekt och darmed star forvaltningen
infOr risk, osäkerhet, okunskap eller obestamdhet
dã beslut skall fattas. Denna studie visar emeller
tid art perspektivet pa fiskerier och fiskeriforvalt
ning blir alltf’Or snävt om man enbart beaktar eko
logiska fragestailningar. Forvaltningen av fiskre
surser är en ekonomisk och socio-politisk verksam
het som kan betraktas som en form av samhalls
planering. Studien lyfter fram tvã uppfattningar om
planering: den ena betraktar planeringen som en
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serie gradvisa ingrepp i utvecklingen medan den
andra utgãr fran kiara helhetslosningar med stark
betoning pa Overgripande mâl. Den stegvisa plane
ringen betonar kommunikation mellan alla inbian
de parter, mdjligheter till revision av málsättnin
gen och en diskussion om bade mãl och medel. En
diskussion om de medel som skall användas for att
uppnã fastslagna mãl är irrelevant da planeringen
utgãr fran helhetslosningar. Skilinaden i synsätt kan
áterfdras pa tolkningen av planeringens rationali
tet. Helhetsplanering bygger pa en instrumentell
mãlinriktad rationalitet som utgar fran att berak
ningar kan ge de riktiga svaren pa alla relevanta
frãgor. Den stegvisa planeringen betonar kommu
nikationens roll: planering handlar om att valja, men
valet är en i5verenskommelse, inte resultatet av en
utrakning.
I mm studie har jag lyft fram kopplingen mel
lan planeringssynen och bristen pa ekologisk kuns
kap. Denna synvinkel lyfter fram nya typer av
brist pa kunskap, men ocksa nya kallor till infor
mation fOr fiskerifOrvaltningen. Bristen pa kunskap
kan galla t.ex. socio-ekonomiska forhãllanden eller
orsakssammanhang, men ocksâ frâgor om sjalva
forvaltningens malsattning. Det allmanna mâlet att
uppna en hãllbar utveckling as innehãllslOst utan
en detaljerad analys av vad begreppet innebär fOr
fiskresursema, for dem som utnyttjar bestãnden och
for andra intresserade. Ifall fiskeriforvaitningen
fOrnekar detta och ifall fiskeriforskningen later bli
att befatta sig med dessa aspekter av forvaitnings
problematiken kan beslutsfattare drivas in i situa
tioner av okunskap, vid vilka beslut fattas pa otil
Irackliga grunder. Det faktum att forvaitningen av
fiskeresurser ofta rakar in i lãsta situationer tyder
pa att fiskeriforvaitningen seft sin uppgift alltfOr
snävt. Det leder till att samma argument upprepas
fran ar till ar, trots att alla parter finner situationen
ohàllbar. FOljden är att manga viktiga fiskresurser
overexploateras konstant. I värsta fall sker en for
battring fOrst dá resursen kollapsar, t.ex. därfor att
fiskbestSndets forokriing misslyckats under en fOljd
av ár. I en sãdan situationen blir alla parter tvung
na att tanka om och da kan helt nya forvaitnings
system infOras.
Detta arbete ger en ny syn pa fiskerivetenskap
ens roll och mojlighet att bidra till en hãllbar Ut
veckling av fiskerier genom att samtidigt analyse
ra fiskeriforvaltning som planering och tillgangen
pa kunskap om ekologiska processer och andra re
levanta faktorer. Slutsatsen är att den frustration
forskningen ofta kant infOr Overxpioateringen av
fiskresurser delvis beror pa fOrestailningen att fis
kerifOrvaltning alltid bOr flirverkligas som hel
hetsplanering pa basen av (begransad) biologisk
kunskap. Det hr lhtt aft visa att okunskapen om
mánga fiskbestánd och deras exploatering hr sa
kompakt aft inte ens de mest sofistikerade riskana
lyser formar ge fiskeriforvaltningen en tiliracklig
grund fOr entydiga beslut som skulle garantera ett
hâllbart fiske. Det finns emellertid ocksá exempel
pa fiskerier som as sa enkla och vhlundersOkta att
en expertstyrd fOrvaitning kan fatta beslut utgaen
de fran en avvhgning mellan olika risker. For att
skapa fOrutsattningar for produktion av relevant
fiskerivetenskaplig information bOr man for varje
fiskeri reda Ut vilket slag av brist pa kunskap som
dominerar samt hur denna brist paverkar de beslut
som skall och kan fattas. Ur forvaltningens syn
vinkel kan detaljkunskap om t.ex. fiskens tillvhxt
vara meningslOs ifall hela fiskets struktur hailer pa
aft fOrhndras.
Det hr svart aft kategorisera alla olika typer av
fiskerier for aft entydigt besthmma vilken typ av
fiskerivetenskapligt stod fOrvaltningen behOver. En
sadan kategorisering skulle i sjhlva verket sta i
konflikt med en av de centrala observationema i
detta arbete: helhetsplanering utgaende fran fast
spikade malsattningar hr mOjlig endast i begransad
omfattning i fiskeriforvaitningen. Istallet hr det
mOjligt aft stalia upp vissa kriterier som bOr upp
fyllas av det vetenskapliga stOdet for forvaltnings
beslut. Kriterierna skall beakta mOjlighetema att
genomfOra malinriktade berakningar av hhndelser
och konsekvenser och behovet av diskussioner
melian alla inbiandade parter om alternativa atgar
der och beslut. Darigenom bOr det vetenskapliga
stOdet for fiskeriforvaltning vara:
— Overgripande (beaktar bade ekologiska och
socio-ekonomiska sidor av utnyttjandet av
fiskresurser),
— fokuserat (skapar inte skeninfonnation genom
aft upprepa samma resultat i olika form),
— logiskt uppbyggt (slutsatser kan hhrledas fran
premisser, samma grundantaganden anvands
genomgaende),
— noggrant (data insamlas och behandlas i
enlighet med utvarderad och accepterad
metodik),
— praktiskt tillampbart (de altemativ som
framfOrs fOrankras i verkligheten),
— fOrstaeligt (de som utnyttjar informationen
skall ha en reell mojlighet aft se pa vilka
grunder olika alternativ har jämfOrts), samt
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— neutralt (alternativ skall analyseras och
presenteras utan dold eller oppen politisk eller
ideologisk vinkling COr att kunna stoda en
diskussion som ocksb utgbr fran varderingar).
Dessa kriterier kan anpassas flexibelt till olika
situationer och kan anvandas trots alt fiskets varia
tionsrikedom utesluter en entydig tolkning av
begreppet hbllbar utveckling. Forskningen kan
emellertid skapa Rirutsattningar Thr en strävan mot
hbllbar utveckling pa ett praktiskt plan genom att
stOda de diskussioner som behOvs. En fiirutsattning
är att forskningen lyckas ge forvaitningen och an
dra intressegrupper en uppfattning om hur olika
ekologiska och socio-ekonomiska fdrhbllanden
hanger ihop, samtidigt som den dppet redovisar fOr
bristerna i var kunskap om fiskerier.
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Appendix I
The ACFM reports used as a source of data.
ICES 1979. Reports of the ICES Advisory Committee on Fishery Management,
Rep. 85, 157 pp.
ICES 1980. Reports of the ICES Advisory Committee on Fishery Management,
Rep. 93, 214 pp.
ICES 1981. Reports of the ICES Advisory Committee on Fishery Management,
Rep. 102, 234 pp.
ICES 1982. Reports of the ICES Advisory Committee on Fishery Management,
Rep. 114,280 pp.
ICES 1983. Reports of the ICES Advisory Committee on Fishery Management,
Rep. 119, 473 pp.
ICES 1984. Reports of the ICES Advisory Committee on Fishery Management,
Rep. 128, 294 pp.
ICES 1985. Reports of the ICES Advisory Committee on Fishery Management,
Rep. 131, 336 pp.
ICES 1986. Reports of the ICES Advisory Committee on Fishery Management,
Rep. 137, 422 pp.
ICES 1987. Reports of the ICES Advisory Committee on Fishery Management,
Rep. 146, 388 pp.
ICES 1988. Reports of the ICES Advisory Committee on Fishery Management,
Rep. 153, 415 pp.
ICES 1989. Reports of the ICES Advisory Committee on Fishery Management,
Rep. 161, 417 pp.
ICES 1990. Reports of the ICES Advisory Committee on Fishery Management,
Rep. 168, part 1, 361 pp., part 2, 91 pp.
ICES 1991. Reports of the ICES Advisory Committee on Fishery Management
Rep. 173, part 1, 386 pp., part 2, 130 pp.
ICES 1992. Reports of the ICES Advisory Committee on Fishery Management
Rep. 179, part 1, 368 pp., part 2, 72 pp.
1978. ICES Coop. Res.
1979. ICES Coop. Res.
1980. ICES Coop. Res.
1981. ICES Coop. Res.
1982. ICES Coop. Res.
1983. ICES Coop. Res.
1984. ICES Coop. Res.
1985. ICES Coop. Res.
1986. ICES Coop. Res.
1987. ICES Coop. Res.
1988. ICES Coop. Res.
1989. ICES Coop. Res.
1990. iCES Coop. Res.
1991. ICES Coop. Res.
ICES 1993. Reports of the ICES Advisory Committee on Fishery Management 1992. ICES Coop. Res.
Rep. 193, part 1, 389 pp., part 2, 79 pp.
ICES 1994. Reports of the ICES Advisory Committee on Fishery Management 1993. ICES Coop. Res.
Rep. 196, part 1, 374 pp., part 2, 102 pp.
ICES 1995. Reports of the ICES Advisory Committee on Fishery Management, 1994. ICES Coop. Res.
Rep. 210, part 1, 312 pp., part 2, 222 pp.
ICES 1996. Reports of the ICES Advisory Committee on Fishery Management, 1995. ICES Coop. Res.
Rep. 214, part 1, 355 pp., part 2, 281 pp.
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Appendix 2
Data used to analyse association between recommendations for exploitation (RECCAT), recruitment
variability (RECVAR, RECRCLA), mean catch (MEANCA), unit price (UNITP, PRICCLA) and value of
catch (VALCLA). Data on recommendations from ICES ACFM reports 1990-1996, recruitment variabili
ty from Myers et al. (1995a) and price information from FAQ (1995b). Stock codes (abbreviated to eight
characters) as in appendix 3.
STOCK YEAR RECCAT RECVAR MEANCA UNITP RECRCLA VALCLA PRICCLA
anglervi 1992 2 0.37 16.90 2.660 4 3 3
anglervi 1993 1 0.37 16.90 2.660 4 3 3
anglervi 1994 1 0.37 16.90 2.660 4 3 3
anglervi 1995 1 0.37 16.90 2.660 4 3 3
capba 1990 1 0.64 1052.00 0.074 4 3
capba 1992 1 0.64 1052.00 0.074 4 3 1
capba 1993 3 0.64 1052.00 0.074 4 3 1
capba 1994 3 0.64 1052.00 0.074 4 3 1
capba 1995 3 0.64 1052.00 0.074 4 3 1
capelvxi 1990 1 0.20 605.00 0.074 2 3 1
capelvxi 1992 1 0.20 605.00 0.074 2 3 1
capelvxi 1993 1 0.20 605.00 0.074 2 3
capelvxi 1994 1 0.20 605.00 0.074 2 3 1
capelvxi 1995 1 0.20 605.00 0.074 2 3 1
cod2224 1990 3 0.33 36.70 0.990 3 3 2
cod2224 1992 3 0.33 36.70 0.990 3 3 2
cod2224 1993 3 0.33 36.70 0.990 3 3 2
cod2224 1994 1 0.33 36.70 0.990 3 3 2
cod2224 1995 3 0.33 36.70 0.990 3 3 2
cod2532 1990 3 0.31 214.00 0.990 3 4 2
cod2532 1992 3 0.31 214.00 0.990 3 4 2
cod2532 1993 3 0.31 214.00 0.990 3 4 2
cod2532 1994 3 0.31 214.00 0.990 3 4 2
cod2532 1995 3 0.31 214.00 0.990 3 4 2
codfarvb 1990 3 0.25 24.70 0.990 2 3 2
codfarvb 1992 3 0.25 24.70 0.990 2 3 2
codfarvb 1993 3 0.25 24.70 0.990 2 3 2
codfarvb 1994 3 0.25 24.70 0.990 2 3 2
codfarvb 1995 3 0.25 24.70 0.990 2 3 2
codgreen 1990 1 . 110.00 0.990 . 4 2
codgreen 1994 3 . 110.00 0.990 . 4 2
codgreen 1995 3 . 110.00 0.990 . 4 2
codicelv 1990 1 . . .
codicelv 1992 3 0.16 393.00 0.990 1 4 2
codicelv 1993 3 0.16 393.00 0.990 1 4 2
codicelv 1994 3 0.16 393.00 0.990 1 4 2
codicelv 1995 3 0.16 393.00 0.990 1 4 2
codiiia 1990 2 0.26 19.60 0.990 2 3 2
codiiia 1992 3 0.26 19.60 0.990 2 3 2
codiiia 1993 3 0.26 19.60 0.990 2 3 2
codiv 1990 3 0.26 196.00 0.990 2 4 2
codiv 1991 3 0.26 196.00 0.990 2 4 2
codiv 1992 3 0.26 196.00 0.990 2 4 2
codiv 1993 3 0.26 196.00 0.990 2 4 2
codiv 1994 3 0.26 196.00 0.990 2 4 2
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codiv 1995 3 0.26 196.00 0.990 2 4 2
codnearc 1990 1 0.33 677.00 0.990 3 4 2
codnearc 1992 1 0.33 677.00 0.990 3 4 2
codnearc 1993 1 0.33 677.00 0.990 3 4 2
codnearc 1994 1 0.33 677.00 0.990 3 4 2
codnearc 1995 1 0.33 677.00 0.990 3 4 2
codvia 1990 3 0.21 16.10 0.990 2 2 2
codvia 1991 3 0.21 16.10 0.990 2 2 2
codvia 1992 3 0.21 16.10 0.990 2 2 2
codvia 1993 3 0.21 16.10 0.990 2 2 2
codvia 1994 3 0.21 16.10 0.990 2 2 2
codvia 1995 3 0.21 16.10 0.990 2 2 2
codviia 1990 3 0.20 9.62 0.990 2 2 2
codviia 1991 3 0.20 9.62 0.990 2 2 2
codviia 1992 3 0.20 9.62 0.990 2 2 2
codviia 1993 3 0.20 9.62 0.990 2 2 2
codviia 1994 3 0.20 9.62 0.990 2 2 2
codviia 1995 3 0.20 9.62 0.990 2 2 2
codviid 1993 3 0.28 5.59 0.990 3 1 2
codviid 1994 3 0.28 5.59 0.990 3 1 2
codviid 1995 3 0.28 5.59 0.990 3 1 2
codviifr 1990 3 0.36 6.68 0.990 4 1 2
codviifv 1991 2 0.36 6.68 0.990 4 1 2
codviifv 1992 3 0.36 6.68 0.990 4 1 2
codviifv 1993 3 0.36 6.68 0.990 4 1 2
codviifv 1994 3 0.36 6.68 0.990 4 1 2
codviifv 1995 3 0.36 6.68 0.990 4 1 2
grhalsub 1990 3 0.08 28.10 2.660 1 3 3
grhalsub 1992 3 0.08 28.10 2.660 1 3 3
grhalsub 1993 2 0.08 28.10 2.660 1 3 3
grhalsub 1994 3 0.08 28.10 2.660 1 3 3
grhalsub 1995 3 0.08 28.10 2.660 1 3 3
grhalvxi 1990 2 0.09 32.80 2.660 1 4 3
grhalvxi 1992 1 0.09 32.80 2.660 1 4 3
grhalvxi 1993 1 0.09 32.80 2.660 1 4 3
grhalvxi 1994 3 0.09 32.80 2.660 1 4 3
grhalvxi 1995 3 0.09 32.80 2.660 1 4 3
hadfarvb 1990 1 0.50 16.20 0.990 4 2 2
hadfarvb 1991 1 0.50 16.20 0.990 4 2 2
hadfarvb 1992 2 0.50 16.20 0.990 4 2 2
hadfarvb 1993 3 0.50 16.20 0.990 4 2 2
hadfarvb 1994 3 0.50 16.20 0.990 4 2 2
hadfarvb 1995 1 0.50 16.20 0.990 4 2 2
hadiv 1990 3 0.49 300.00 0.990 4 4 2
hadiv 1991 3 0.49 300.00 0.990 4 4 2
hadiv 1992 3 0.49 300.00 0.990 4 4 2
hadiv 1993 3 0.49 300.00 0.990 4 4 2
hadiv 1994 3 0.49 300.00 0.990 4 4 2
hadiv 1995 2 0.49 300.00 0.990 4 4 2
hadnearc 1990 3 0.59 122.00 0.990 4 4 2
hadnearc 1992 1 0.59 122.00 0.990 4 4 2
hadnearc 1993 1 0.59 122.00 0.990 4 4 2
hadnearc 1994 1 0.59 122.00 0.990 4 4 2
hadnearc 1995 1 0.59 122.00 0.990 4 4 2
hadvia 1990 3 0.47 34.20 0.990 4 3 2
hadvia 1991 3 0.47 34.20 0.990 4 3 2
hadvia 1992 3 0.47 34.20 0.990 4 3 2
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hadvia 1993 3 0.47 34.20 0.990 4 3 2
hadvia 1994 3 0.47 34.20 0.990 4 3 2
hadvia 1995 3 0.47 34.20 0.990 4 3 2
hadvib 1990 1 0.48 6.30 0.990 4 1 2
hadvib 1991 1 0.48 6.30 0.990 4 1 2
hadvib 1992 3 0.48 6.30 0.990 4 1 2
hadvib 1994 1 0.48 6.30 0.990 4 1 2
hadvib 1995 I 0.48 6.30 0.990 4 1 2
hakeiiia 1990 1 0.10 57.30 0.990 1 3 2
hakeiiia 1992 2 0.10 57.30 0.990 1 3 2
hakeiiia 1993 3 0.10 57.30 0.990 1 3 2
hakeiiia 1994 3 0.10 57.30 0.990 1 3 2
hakeiiia 1995 3 0.10 57.30 0.990 1 3 2
hakeviii 1990 2 0.42 15.30 0.990 4 2 2
hakeviii 1992 3 0.42 15.30 0.990 4 2 2
hakeviii 1993 3 0.42 15.30 0.990 4 2 2
hakeviii 1994 3 0.42 15.30 0.990 4 2 2
hakeviii 1995 3 0.42 15.30 0.990 4 2 2
her2529 1990 1 0.16 281.00 0.230 1 3 1
her2529 1991 I 0.16 281.00 0.230 1 3 1
her2529 1992 I 0.16 281.00 0.230 1 3 1
her2529 1993 I 0.16 281.00 0.230 1 3 1
her2529 1994 1 0.16 281.00 0.230 1 3 1
her2529 1995 1 0.16 281.00 0.230 1 3 1
her30 1990 1 0.29 25.90 0.230 3 1 1
her30 1991 1 0.29 25.90 0.230 3 1 1
her3o 1992 1 0.29 25.90 0.230 3 1 1
her30 1993 1 0.29 25.90 0.230 3 1 1
her30 1994 1 0.29 25.90 0.230 3 1 1
her30 1995 1 0.29 25.90 0.230 3 1 1
her3l 1990 1 0.28 7.50 0.230 3 1 1
her3l 1991 1 0.28 7.50 0.230 3 1 1
her3l 1992 1 0.28 7.50 0.230 3 1 1
her3l 1993 1 0.28 7.50 0.230 3 1 1
her3l 1994 1 0.28 7.50 0.230 3 1 1
her3l 1995 1 0.28 7.50 0.230 3 1 1
hercelvi 1990 3 . 21.10 4.224 . 3 3
hercelvi 1993 1 . 21.10 4.224 . 3 3
hercelvi 1994 1 . 21.10 4.224 . 3 3
hercelvi 1995 3 . 21.10 4.224 . 3 3
hericelv 1990 1 0.40 49.60 0.230 4 2 1
hericelv 1991 1 0.40 49.60 0.230 4 2 1
hericelv 1992 1 0.40 49.60 0.230 4 2 1
hericelv 1993 1 0.40 49.60 0.230 4 2 1
hericelv 1994 1 0.40 49.60 0.230 4 2 1
hericelv 1995 1 0.40 49.60 0.230 4 2 1
heriviii 1990 2 0.38 565.00 0.230 4 4 1
heriviii 1991 1 0.38 565.00 0.230 4 4 1
heriviii 1992 2 0.38 565.00 0.230 4 4 1
heriviii 1993 1 0.38 565.00 0.230 4 4 1
heriviii 1994 2 0.38 565.00 0.230 4 4 1
heriviii 1995 3 0.38 565.00 0.230 4 4 1
hemospr 1990 3 0.82 571.00 0.230 4 4 1
hemospr 1991 3 0.82 571.00 0.230 4 4 1
hemospr 1992 1 0.82 571.00 0.230 4 4 1
hemospr 1993 1 0.82 571.00 0.230 4 4 1
hemospr 1994 1 0.82 571.00 0.230 4 4 1
54 Hildén Monographs of the Boreal Environment Research No. 5
0.82 571.00 0.230
• 5.50 0.230
• 5.50 0.230
• 5.50 0.230
• 5.50 0.230
0.30 56.20 0.230
0.30 56.20 0.230
0.30 56.20 0.230
0.30 56.20 0.230
53.60 0.300
0.29 680.00 0.300
0.29 680.00 0.300
0.29 680.00 0.300
0.29 680.00 0.300
0.12 18.70 0.990
0.12 18.70 0.990
0.12 18.70 0.990
0.12 18.70 0.990
0.45 1.80 0.990
0.45 1.80 0.990
0.45 1.80 0.990
0.31 297.00 0.074
0.31 297.00 0.074
0.31 297.00 0.074
0.18 122.00 2.660
0.18 122.00 2.660
0.18 122.00 2.660
0.18 122.00 2.660
0.18 122.00 2.660
0.18 122.00 2.660
0.15 3.90 2.660
0.15 3.90 2.660
0.15 3.90 2.660
0.15 3.90 2.660
0.15 3.90 2.660
0.15 3.90 2.660
0.15 6.50 2.660
0.15 6.50 2.660
0.15 6.50 2.660
0.15 6.50 2.660
0.15 6.50 2.660
0.15 6.50 2.660
0.22 1.53 2.660
0.22 1.53 2.660
0.22 1.53 2.660
0.22 1.53 2.660
0.23 1.42 2.660
0.23 1.42 2.660
0.23 1.42 2.660
0.23 1.42 2.660
0.23 1.42 2.660
0.23 1.42 2.660
0.21 33.50 0.990
0.21 33.50 0.990
0.21 33.50 0.990
0.21 33.50 0.990
4 4 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
3 2 1
3 2 1
3 2 1
3 2 1
2 1
3 4 1
3 4 1
3 4 1
3 4 1
1 2 2
1 2 2
1 2 2
1 2 2
4 1 2
4 1 2
3 3 1
3 3 1
3 3 1
1 4 3
1 4 3
1 4 3
1 4 3
1 4 3
1 4 3
1 2 3
1 2 3
1 2 3
1 2 3
1 2 3
1 2 3
1 2 3
1 2 3
1 2 3
1 2 3
1 2 3
1 2 3
2 1 3
2 1 3
2 1 3
2 1 3
2 1 3
2 1 3
2 1 3
2 1 3
2 1 3
2 1 3
2 3 2
2 3 2
2 3 2
2 3 2
hemospr 1995 1
herviaC 1990 1
herviaC 1991 1
herviaC 1992 3
herviaC 1994 3
hervian 1990 1
hervian 1991 1
hervian 1992 1
hervian 1994 1
mackevii 1995 1
mackewes 1990 3
mackewes 1993 1
mackewes 1994 3
mackewes 1995 3
megrviib 1992 1
megrviib 1993 1
megrviib 1994 1
megrviib 1995 1
megrviic 1990 1
megrviic 1992 1
megrviic 1993 1
megrviic 1994 2
norpouti 1993 1
norpouti 1994 1
norpouti
1995 1
plaiceiv 1990 1
plaiceiv 1991 2
plaiceiv 1992 1
plaiceiv 1993 1
plaiceiv 1994 3
plaiceiv 1995 3
plaicevi 1990 3
plaicevi 1991 2
plaicevi 1992 2
plaicevi 1993 2
plaicevi 1994 2
plaicevi 1995 1
plaicevi 1990 2
plaicevi 1991 3
plaicevi 1992 1
plaicevi 1993 1
plaicevi 1994 1
plaicevi 1995 1
plaicevi 1992 2
plaicevi 1993 1
plaicevi 1994 2
plaicevi 1995 3
plaicevi 1990 1
plaicevi 1991 1
plaicevi 1992 1
plaicevi 1993 1
plaicevi 1994 1
plaicevi 1995 2
saitfarv 1990 3
saitfarv 1992 3
saitfarv 1993 3
saitfarv 1994 3
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saitfarv 1995 1 0.21 33.50 0.990 2 3 2
saithvi 1995 1 0.12 23.10 0.990 1 3 2
saiticel 1990 2 0.21 76.40 0.990 2 3 2
saiticel 1992 1 0.21 76.40 0.990 2 3 2
saiticel 1993 1 0.21 76.40 0.990 2 3 2
saiticel 1994 1 0.21 76.40 0.990 2 3 2
saiticel 1995 1 0.21 76.40 0.990 2 3 2
saitivii 1995 1 0.24 169.00 0.990 2 4 2
saitnear 1990 1 0.20 161.00 0.990 2 4 2
saitnear 1992 1 0.20 161.00 0.990 2 4 2
saitnear 1993 1 0.20 161.00 0.990 2 4 2
saitnear 1994 1 0.20 161.00 0.990 2 4 2
saitnear 1995 1 0.20 161.00 0.990 2 4 2
salmbal 1992 3
. 3.00 2.900
. 1 3
salmbal 1993 3
. 3.00 2.900 . 1 3
salmbal 1994 3
. 3.00 2.900 . 1 3
salmbal 1995 3 . 3.00 2.900
. 1 3
salmgof 1990 2 . 0.20 2.900 . 1 3
salmgof 1991 2 . 0.20 2.900 . 1 3
salmgof 1992 3 . 0.20 2.900 . 1 3
salmgof 1993 3
. 0.20 2.900
. 1 3
salmgof 1994 3 . 0.20 2.900
. 1 3
salmgof 1995 3
. 0.20 2.900 . 1 3
sandeeli 1990 1 0.30 717.00 0.074 3 3 1
sandeeli 1993 1 0.30 717.00 0.074 3 3 1
sandeeli 1994 1 0.30 717.00 0.074 3 3 1
sandeeli 1995 1 0.30 717.00 0.074 3 3 1
sandeels 1990 1 0.34 15.10 0.074 3 1 1
sandeels 1991 1 0.34 15.10 0.074 3 1 1
sandeels 1992 3 0.34 15.10 0.074 3 1 1
sandeels 1993 1 0.34 15.10 0.074 3 1 1
sandeels 1994 1 0.34 15.10 0.074 3 1 1
sardviii 1990 1 0.19 162.00 0.230 1 3 1
sardviii 1995 3 0.19 162.00 0.230 1 3 1
sebmarvv 1995 3 0.48 76.60 2.240 4 4 2
sebmenne 1990 2 0.28 59.90 2.240 3 4 2
sebmenne 1992 1 0.28 59.90 2.240 3 4 2
sebmenne 1993 1 0.28 59.90 2.240 3 4 2
sebmenne 1994 3 0.28 59.90 2.240 3 4 2
sebmenne 1995 3 0.28 59.90 2.240 3 4 2
sebmenva 1995 2 . 46.70 2.240 . 4 2
soleiv 1990 3 0.35 22.70 2.660 3 3 3
soleiv 1991 2 0.35 22.70 2.660 3 3 3
soleiv 1992 1 0.35 22.70 2.660 3 3 3
solely 1993 1 0.35 22.70 2.660 3 3 3
soleiv 1994 1 0.35 22.70 2.660 3 3 3
soleiv 1995 3 0.35 22.70 2.660 3 3 3
soleviia 1990 2 0.23 1.52 2.660 2 1 3
solevila 1991 1 0.23 1.52 2.660 2 1 3
soleviia 1992 2 0.23 1.52 2.660 2 1 3
soleviia 1993 1 0.23 1.52 2.660 2 1 3
soleviia 1994 3 0.23 1.52 2.660 2 1 3
soleviia 1995 2 0.23 1.52 2.660 2 1 3
soleviid 1990 1 0.30 4.10 2.660 3 2 3
soleviid 1991 3 0.30 4.10 2.660 3 2 3
soleviid 1992 3 0.30 4.10 2.660 3 2 3
soleviid 1993 2 0.30 4.10 2.660 3 2 3
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soleviid 1994 1 0.30 4.10 2.660 3 2 3
soleviid 1995 1 0.30 4.10 2.660 3 2 3
soleviie 1990 3 0.20 0.90 2.660 2 1 3
soleviie 1992 3 0.20 0.90 2.660 2 1 3
soleviie 1993 1 0.20 0.90 2.660 2 1 3
soleviie 1994 1 0.20 0.90 2.660 2 1 3
soleviie 1995 2 0.20 0.90 2.660 2 1 3
soleviif 1990 1 0.25 1.18 2.660 2 1 3
soleviif 1991 1 0.25 1.18 2.660 2 1 3
soleviif 1992 1 0.25 1.18 2.660 2 1 3
soleviif 1993 1 0.25 1.18 2.660 2 1 3
soleviif 1994 1 0.25 1.18 2.660 2 1 3
soleviif 1995 2 0.25 1.18 2.660 2 1 3
soleviii 1992 1 0.07 5.25 2.660 1 2 3
soleviii 1993 1 0.07 5.25 2.660 1 2 3
soleviii 1994 1 0.07 5.25 2.660 1 2 3
soleviii 1995 1 0.07 5.25 2.660 1 2 3
soleviii 1990 1 . . . .
soleviii 1991 1 0.07 5.25 2.660 1 2 3
sprat223 1990 1 0.36 119.00 0.074 4 1 1
sprat223 1991 1 0.36 119.00 0.074 4 1 1
sprat223 1992 1 0.36 119.00 0.074 4 1 1
sprat223 1993 1 0.36 119.00 0.074 4 1 1
sprat223 1994 1 0.36 119.00 0.074 4 1 1
sprat223 1995 1 0.36 119.00 0.074 4 1 1
whitiv 1990 3 0.23 150.00 0.990 2 4 2
whitiv 1991 3 0.23 150.00 0.990 2 4 2
whitiv 1992 3 0.23 150.00 0.990 2 4 2
whitiv 1993 3 0.23 150.00 0.990 2 4 2
whitiv 1994 3 0.23 150.00 0.990 2 4 2
whitiv 1995 2 0.23 150.00 0.990 2 4 2
whitiv 1995 2 0.25 6.50 0.990 2 1 2
whitvia 1990 3 0.29 13.90 0.990 3 2 2
whitvia 1991 3 0.29 13.90 0.990 3 2 2
whitvia 1992 3 0.29 13.90 0.990 3 2 2
whitvia 1993 3 0.29 13.90 0.990 3 2 2
whitvia 1994 3 0.29 13.90 0.990 3 2 2
whitvia 1995 3 0.29 13.90 0.990 3 2 2
whitviia 1990 3 0.13 11.10 0.990 1 2 2
whitviia 1992 3 0.13 11.10 0.990 1 2 2
whitviia 1993 1 0.13 11.10 0.990 1 2 2
whitviia 1994 1 0.13 11.10 0.990 1 2 2
whitviia 1995 1 0.13 11.10 0.990 1 2 2
whitviif 1990 1 0.27 9.64 0.990 2 2 2
whitviif 1991 1 0.27 9.64 0.990 2 2 2
whitviif 1992 2 0.27 9.64 0.990 2 2 2
whitviif 1993 3 0.27 9.64 0.990 2 2 2
whitviif 1994 3 0.27 9.64 0.990 2 2 2
whitviif 1995 3 0.27 9.64 0.990 2 2 2
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Appendix 3
Stocks used in the analysis of recommendations and their codes in systematic order.
CLUPEIFORMES
Clupeidae Code
Clupea harengus (Herring)
Baltic Sea, Subdivisions 25-29,32 and Gulf of Riga her2529
Bothnian Sea, Subdivision 30 her30
Bothnian Bay, Subdivision 31 her3 1
Celtic Sea and Division VIIj hercelviij
Icelandic summer spawning herring hericelva
North Sea herring heriviiia
Norwegian spring spawning herring hemosprsp
Clyde herring herviaC
Division VIa North hervian
Sardinia pilchardus (Sardine) sardviiicixa
Sprattus sprallus (Sprat)
Baltic Sea, Subdivisions 22-32 sprat2232
GADIFORMES
Gadidae
Gadus morhua (Cod)
Baltic Sea, Subdivisions 22-24 cod2224
Baltic Sea, Subdivisions 25-32 cod2532
Faroe plateau, Subdivision Vbl codfarvbl
East Greenland cod codgreenl
Icelandic cod codicelva
Division lila codiiia
North Sea cod codiv
North-East Arctic cod codneare
Division VIa (West of Scotland) codvia
Irish Sea codviia
English Channel codviid
Celtic Sea codviifviigviih
Melanogrammus aeglefinus (Haddock)
Faroe haddock, Division Vb hadfarvb
North Sea haddock hadiv
North-East Arctic haddock hadnearc
Division VIa (West of Scotland) hadvia
Division Vb (Rockall) hadvib
Merlangius merlangus (Whiting)
North Sea whiting whitiv
Division VIa (West of Scotland) whitvia
Irish Sea whitviia
Celtic Sea whitviifviigviih
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Pollachius virens (Saithe)
Faroe saithe, Division Vb saitfarvb
Division VI saithvi
Icelandic saithe, Division Va saiticelva
North Sea saitiviiia
Nort-East Arctic saithe saitnearc
Trisopterus esmarkii (Norway pout)
North Sea norpoutiv
Merluccius merluccius (Hake)
Northern stock hakeiiiaivviviiviiiabN
Southern stock hakeviiicixa
LOPHIIFORMES
Lophiidae
Lophius piscatorius (AnglerfishfMonkfish) anglerviib-kviia-b
PERCIFORMES
Ammodytidae
Ammodytes marinus (Sandeel)
North Sea sandeeliv
Shetland Islands sandeelshet
Scombridae
Scomber scombrus (Mackerel)
Western mackerel mackewes
Division Vilic, IXa mackeviiicixas
PLEURONECTIFORMES
Pleuronectidae
Pleuronectes platessa (Plaice)
North Sea plaiceiv
Irish Sea plaiceviia
Division VIld plaiceviid
Division Vile plaiceviie
Celtic Sea plaiceviifviig
Reinhardtius hippoglossoides (Greenland halibut)
Sub-areas I, II grhalsubl2
Sub-areas V XIV grhalvxiv
Scophthalmidae
Lepidorhombus wh(/jIagonis (Megrim)
Divisions VIIb,c,e-k,VIiIa,b megrviib,c,e-kviiia,b
Divisions VIIIc,IXa megrviiicixa
Soleidae
Solea vulgaris (Sole)
North Sea soleiv
Irish Sea soleviia
Division Vild soleviid
Division Vile soleviie
Celtic Sea soleviifviig
Bay of Biscay soleviiia,b
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SALMONIFORMES
Osmeridae
Mallotus villotus (Capelin)
Barents Sea capba
Sub-areas V, XIV, Division ha W of 5°W capelvxiv
Salmon idae
Salmo salar (Salmon)
Baltic main basin and Gulf of Bothnia salmbal
Gulf of Finland salmgof
SCORPAENIFORMES
Scorpaenidae
Sebastes marinus (Redfish)
North-East Arctic sebmarnear
Sub-areas V, XIV sebmarvvixiv
Sebastes mentella (Redfish)
North-East Arctic sebmennea
Sub-areas ‘vç XIV sebmenvaxiixiv
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Appendix 4
Errata in the individual contributions and additional technical clarifications
Paper I
p. 124 column 2, Equation 8: N should be NT
p. 125 column 1, line 1 N should be NT
p. 125 column 1, line 3 ] should be FT
p. 125 column 1, line 5:
N’T= CT(ZT+MT)I{FT[l-exp(-ZT)]}, should be:
N’T CT(ZT+LMT)/{FT[ 1 -exp(-Z.-AM.)j }
p. 125 column 1, line 9 from bottom:
will increase the relative error, should be:
will increase the absolute error
p. 125, column 2, Table 1 In all column headings M should be AM
p. 126, line 3:
the relative error will increase, should be:
• ..the absolute value of the relative error will increase.
p. 126, column 1, line 7 from bottom N/Nshould be AN,/N,
p. 127:
Additional information for Table 2: M=0.3, C has been scaled out by expressing S(C,) relative to the catch
(see equation 17). This is possible as the catch is fixed (given). All subscripts can be replaced with T-l.
Note the tendency to conserve ZTI.
FT FTI (AM=+.2) FTI (AM-.2)
0.1 0.084 0.121
0.2 0.169 0.240
0.3 0.257 0.357
0.4 0.346 0.472
0.5 0.437 0.586
0.6 0.529 0.698
0.7 0.622 0.809
0.8 0.717 0.919
0.9 0.812 1.028
1.0 0.908 1.137
1.1 1.005 1.244
1.2 1.103 1.351
1.3 1.202 1.458
1.4 1.301 1.563
1.5 1.400 1.669
Paper II
p. 91, column 2, 4 lines above heading “Results”
...an even distribution..., should be: ...a uniform distribution...
p. 96, error in alphabetical order of reference list: Finn et al. (1986) should follow Gulland (1983).
Paper III
p. 40, Equation (3) should be:
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k
V(k,R(0)) = o’ H(j)
j=0
p. 40, line 13 k = 1,2..., should be: k0,1,2,...
p. 44, Equation should be corrected as equation (3) to
V(cx,R(0)) = y j*I H(j)
j=0
Paper IV
Heading: Short Team TAC Advice ..., should be:
Short Term TAC Advice
p. 54, Fig. 1, figure caption: missing specification of axis: SSB = Spawning Stock Biomass
p. 55, Table I,
table caption. BIO=Spawning Stock Biomass; add missing additional explanation: (SSB in Figures).
Column heading R2 (regression coefficient) should not be confused with R = recruitment in models used.
p. 55, Fig. 2,
specification of x-axis SBB should be SSB
Figure caption, line 2: stock biomass and recruitment...
should read: stock biomass...
p. 56, Fig. 3,
errors as for Fig. 2
p. 57, Fig. 4,
Figure caption, line 2: stock biomass and recruitment...
should be: stock biomass...
p. 58, Fig. 5,
errors as for Fig. 4
p. 60, line 1: In the approach outline above..., should be:
In the approach outlined above...
Paper V
p. 65, line 6: Management, 1980, should be Management, 1990
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